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Federal System: A Peek Behind Closed Doors
Arthur Hellman
Abstract
Ethical issues involving federal judges have been much in the news recently.
Among other developments, the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing to
consider impeaching a federal district judge; the Judicial Conference of the United
States announced two major policy initiatives; and a committee chaired by Justice
Stephen Breyer issued an in-depth report on the operation of the judicial miscon-
duct statutes.
This article addresses two aspects of federal judicial ethics. The first involves
conflict of interest and disqualification. Under the law, a federal judge is disquali-
fied from hearing a case if (among other circumstances) he or she has “a financial
interest ... in a party to the proceeding.” This prohibition has proved to be a fer-
tile ground for muckraking by investigative reporters, in part because judges can
easily fail to remember or recognize that they own shares in corporations that are
parties to cases on their dockets. In September 2006 the Judicial Conference of
the United States directed all federal courts to institute “automatic conflict screen-
ing” using standardized hardware and software. This is a substantial step forward,
but a purely internal screening program does not serve the interest in transparency.
The second set of issues involves the operation of the misconduct statutes. A 1980
statute, now codified as Chapter 16 of Title 28, creates a detailed set of procedures
for handling complaints against judges and taking appropriate action in instances
of judicial misconduct. The Breyer Committee found that in handling the vast
bulk of complaints, the judiciary has properly implemented the 1980 Act, but that
in high-visibility cases, the rate of error is “far too high.” The committee’s report
and other recent developments point to several aspects of the system that deserve
scrutiny. Primary among these is the lack of visibility; neither the availability of
the process nor the outcomes of proceedings are sufficiently publicized.
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United States announced two major policy initiatives; and a committee chaired by 
Justice Stephen Breyer issued an in-depth report on the operation of the judicial 
misconduct statutes.  
This article addresses two aspects of federal judicial ethics. The first 
involves conflict of interest and disqualification. Under the law, a federal judge is 
disqualified from hearing a case if (among other circumstances) the judge’s 
impartiality “might reasonably be questioned,” or if he or she has “a financial 
interest ... in a party to the proceeding.” The first-quoted prohibition has 
generated a large body of case law. The second has proved to be a fertile ground 
for muckraking by investigative reporters, in part because judges can easily fail to 
remember or recognize that they own shares in corporations that are parties to 
cases on their dockets. In September 2006 the Judicial Conference of the United 
States directed all federal courts to institute “automatic conflict screening” using 
standardized hardware and software. This is a substantial step forward, but a 
purely internal screening program does not serve the interest in transparency.  
The second set of issues involves the operation of the misconduct statutes. A 
1980 statute, now codified as Chapter 16 of Title 28, creates a detailed set of 
procedures for handling complaints against judges and taking appropriate action 
in instances of judicial misconduct. The Breyer Committee found that in handling 
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the vast bulk of complaints, the judiciary has properly implemented the 1980 Act, 
but that in high-visibility cases, the rate of error is “far too high.” The 
committee’s report and other recent developments point to several aspects of the 
system that deserve scrutiny. Primary among these is the lack of visibility; neither 
the availability of the process nor the outcomes of proceedings are sufficiently 
publicized.   
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art57
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Introduction 
On September 21, 2006, a remarkable spectacle unfolded in a hearing room 
in the Rayburn House Office Building in Washington. A few months earlier, the 
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee had introduced a resolution 
impeaching Federal District Judge Manuel L. Real “for high crimes and 
misdemeanors.”1 Now, sitting alone at the witness table, the 82-year-old judge 
defended himself vigorously against accusations that he had improperly intervened 
in a bankruptcy case to help a woman whose probation he was supervising after 
she was convicted of various fraud offenses. At one point a member of the 
Judiciary Committee directed his gaze at the judge and said, “Judge Real, because 
of your actions, arguably [a family trust involved in the bankruptcy case] lost tens 
of thousands of dollars in lost rent and also in attorneys‟ fees. Did you feel any 
responsibility for the losses that were incurred by the … trust?” The judge 
responded in a firm voice, “Mr. Smith, I don‟t know anything about the loss.”2  
The Congressman‟s question did not come entirely out of the blue. It echoed 
one of the accusations in a complaint against Judge Real that had been filed more 
than three years earlier – a complaint that led to the initiation of disciplinary 
proceedings against the judge within the judiciary.3 Those proceedings are now in 
the final stage of appeal at the Judicial Conference of the United States.4 
                                              
1 H. Res. 916, 109th Cong. (2006).  
2 Impeaching Manuel L. Real, a Judge of the United States District Court for the Central 
District of California, for High Crimes and Misdemeanors: Hearing on H. Res. 916 Before the 
Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property of the House Committee on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong.  90 (2006) [hereinafter Real Impeachment Hearing]. 
3 See id. at 33 (reprinting complaint). The complaint would ordinarily not be a public 
document, but Judge Real included it in one of the appendices to his hearing statement.  
4 See infra note 175. 
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The entire episode involving Judge Real was a rare public manifestation of a 
process that generally takes place behind closed doors and out of the public eye: 
the regulation of ethics in the federal judiciary. But it does not stand alone. Two 
days before the impeachment hearing, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., released 
a detailed report on the operation of the statutory scheme for regulating judicial 
misconduct.5 The report was prepared by a committee appointed by Chief Justice 
William H. Rehnquist and chaired by Associate Justice Stephen G. Breyer. On the 
same day, the Judicial Conference of the United States, the policymaking arm of 
the judiciary, announced two major policy initiatives relating to judicial ethics.  
With this unusual convergence of events, the time is ripe for a fresh look at 
the regulation of judicial ethics in the federal system. Indeed, notwithstanding its 
obvious importance, the subject has received little attention from academics.6 This 
article examines the two principal areas of recent controversy. Part I deals with 
conflict of interest and disqualification, with particular focus on conflicts 
involving judges‟ financial interests. Part II describes and critiques the system 
established by Congress for identifying and remedying misconduct by federal 
judges.  
In the past, controversy occasionally arose over a third aspect of federal 
judicial ethics: judges‟ attendance at privately funded educational programs. In 
September 2006 the Judicial Conference of the United States responded to the 
                                              
5 See http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/press/pr_09-19-06.html. See infra Part II-
D.  
6 A key document in the regulation of federal judicial ethics is a set of illustrative rules 
promulgated by the Administrative Office of United States Courts. See infra note 91 and 
accompanying text. A Westlaw search (JLR database) reveals that this document was cited in one 
law review article published in 2000; it has not been cited since.  
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criticism by promulgating stringent new disclosure rules.7 Under the new rules, 
most providers of educational programs must disclose sources of financial support, 
and judges must file public reports on the programs they attend.  
The new regime got off to a bad start when the Administrative Office of 
United States Courts (AO) failed to post the relevant information on its web site 
“promptly” in accordance with the Conference directive.8 The AO acknowledged 
its error, and a detailed list of seminars, funders, and presenters has now been 
posted. The new policy – along with a 2004 revision to a Code of Conduct 
Advisory Opinion – appears to address most if not all of the concerns that have 
previously been raised.9 On that premise, this aspect of federal judicial ethics will 
not be further addressed in this article.10  
I. Conflict of Interest and Disqualification 
Two provisions of Title 28 of the United States Code deal with conflict of 
interest and the disqualification or recusal of federal judges. (“Disqualification” 
and “recusal” will be treated as synonymous.) Section 144 establishes procedures 
for assuring that no case is heard by a district judge who “has a personal bias or 
prejudice” against or in favor of any party. Section 455 lays down elaborate rules 
to govern the disqualification of judges and avoid conflicts of interest. Because 
                                              
7 See Judicial Conference Policy on Judges‟ Attendance at Privately Funded Educational 
Programs, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/judbrappc906c.pdf. 
8 See Federal Judiciary Amends Implementation Of Junket Disclosures After Complaints, 75 
U.S.L.W. 2570 (2007). 
9 A leading critic of judges‟ attendance at private seminars called the new policy “a dramatic 
change for the better.” Linda Greenhouse, Federal Judges Take Steps to Improve Accountability, 
N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 2006 at A20. For the current version of Advisory Opinion No. 67, issued 
by the Committee on Codes of Conduct of the Judicial Conference, see 
http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/67.html. 
10 Full assessment of the new system will not be possible until the individual judges‟ reports 
begin to appear on court web sites.  
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section 455 is so much broader in its definition of the circumstances that require 
disqualification, it is invoked far more often than section 144. 
As explained in a comprehensive monograph prepared for the Federal 
Judicial Center, section 455 includes two “separate (though substantially 
overlapping) bases for recusal.”11 Subsection (a) speaks in broad general terms; it 
requires recusal “in any proceeding in which [the judge‟s] impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned.” Subsection (b) lists five specific circumstances that 
require recusal. These include personal bias, prior involvement with the case, and 
“a financial interest ... in a party to the proceeding.”  
A. Conflict of interest based on stock holdings 
The “financial interest” prohibition in the statute has proved to be a fertile 
ground for muckraking by investigative reporters. This is so for four interrelated 
reasons. First, the statutory bar is absolute. Section 455 defines “financial interest” 
as “ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small.” (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, it does not matter whether the judge owns many shares or only one; it does 
not matter whether the party involved in the proceeding is a small partnership or a 
huge publicly held corporation like Microsoft. Second, the prohibition extends not 
only to the judge‟s own financial interests, but also to financial interests of the 
judge‟s “spouse or minor child residing in his household.” Third, the prohibition 
cannot be waived. Indeed, none of the specific circumstances listed in subsection 
(b) are subject to waiver.12 Finally, although the statute requires judges to inform 
themselves about their “personal ... financial interests,” experience has shown that 
                                              
11 Federal Judicial Center, Recusal: Analysis of Case Law Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 & 144 at 
5 (2002) [hereinafter FJC Recusal Study]. 
12 See 28 USC § 455(e). In contrast, waiver is permitted when “the ground for 
disqualification arises only under” § 455(a).  
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art57
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judges can easily fail to remember or recognize that they own shares in 
corporations that are parties to cases on their dockets. When they proceed to 
adjudicate those cases, they are violating section 455, however inadvertent or 
unknowing their conduct.  
Journalists, litigants, and other citizens can monitor judges‟ compliance with 
section 455, but doing so requires considerable effort. Judges, like other federal 
officials, are required to file annual financial disclosure statements listing their 
stock holdings. But the reports are not readily accessible by anyone outside the 
judiciary. The documents are filed only in Washington, and the Judicial 
Conference of the United States, citing security concerns, has resisted efforts to 
make their contents available on the Internet.13 Moreover, when investigators are 
able to review the reports, they often find that some of the required information 
has been omitted. And because the reports are filed annually in May and cover the 
previous calendar year, they will not necessarily reflect a judge‟s current holdings 
at the time of hearing a case.  
Notwithstanding these obstacles, newspapers and advocacy groups have 
occasionally undertaken investigations to determine whether federal judges have 
participated in cases in spite of a conflict of interest that mandated disqualification 
under the statute. One well-known example is the study conducted by the Kansas 
City Star in 1998. The newspaper reported that federal judges in Kansas City and 
elsewhere “repeatedly have presided over lawsuits against companies in which 
they own stock.”14 A year later, the Community Rights Counsel (CRC) publicized 
                                              
13 See “Judges‟ Legitimate Need for Security Cited by Chief Justice,” Third Branch, June 
2000. 
14 See “Stocks and ethics collide in courtroom: KC federal judges have ruled on cases while 
invested in a litigant.” Kansas City Star, Apr. 5, 1998, at A1. 
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a research report indicating that in 1997 eight federal appellate judges took part in 
at least 18 cases in which they had a disqualifying conflict of interest.15 
This evidence of repeated violations of section 455 was brought to the 
attention of Congress in September 2001. The occasion was a hearing of a 
Congressional committee – the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and 
Intellectual Property of the House Judiciary Committee – on operation of the 
misconduct statutes.16 No one seemed to dispute that the judges‟ participation in 
the conflict cases came about because of innocent mistakes or memory lapses. 
Nevertheless, as I observed in my own statement, “episodes of this kind are 
harmful to the judiciary. At best, the judges – and perhaps the winning lawyers – 
suffer embarrassment. At worst, a cloud is cast over the judges‟ integrity.”17 
Shortly after the hearing, Subcommittee Chairman Howard Coble (R., N.C.) 
and Ranking Member Howard Berman (D., Cal.) wrote to Chief Justice Rehnquist 
in his capacity as presiding officer of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States.18 They pointed to the “questions [raised] in some minds about judges‟ 
compliance with the laws governing disqualification.” They explained how the 
existing system makes it difficult for litigants to discover whether judges own 
stock that requires recusal in a particular case. And they suggested a concrete 
remedy. They proposed that the Judicial Conference should “require all federal 
courts to adopt the Iowa model” for posting “conflict lists” on court web sites.  
                                              
15 Joe Stephens, “Judges Rule on Firms in Their Portfolios,” Wash. Post, Sept. 13, 1999, at 
A1.  
16 Operations of Federal Judicial Misconduct Statutes: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on 
Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 107th 
Cong. (2001) [hereinafter 2001 House Misconduct Hearing]. 
17 Id. at 49 (statement of Professor Arthur D. Hellman).  
18 The letter is reprinted in H.R. Rep. 107-459 at 16-18 (2002).  
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The “Iowa model” is an approach pioneered by the federal district court for 
the Northern District of Iowa. Under that model, the court web site posts separate 
lists for each judge of the court. Each list is preceded by this statement: “Pursuant 
to this court‟s policy of disclosing relationships that pose potential or actual 
conflicts of interest, financial or otherwise, Judge [X] will not be handling cases 
involving …” The list that follows may include names of corporations, 
individuals, and law firms. As the Chairman and Ranking Member explained, this 
method of disclosure offers substantial advantages in comparison with judges‟ 
annual financial disclosure reports.  
The benefits of this practice are manifest: the likelihood increases 
that genuine conflicts will be flagged earlier in the litigation process; 
journalists and advocacy groups will have greater access to relevant 
information that will enable them to monitor judicial compliance with 
conflict-of-interest requirements; the lists can be more easily updated than 
annual hard-copy disclosure filings; and the legitimate privacy and safety 
interests of judges [are] not compromised (since the lists only indicate that 
a judge is recused from cases involving specific corporations, and nothing 
more). 
The Judicial Conference did not adopt this suggestion, and in 2006 history 
repeated itself: blogs and advocacy groups accused two district judges (James H. 
Payne of the Eastern District of Oklahoma and Terrence W. Boyle of the Eastern 
District of North Carolina) of failing to recuse themselves from cases involving 
companies in which they held investments. Neither Judge Payne nor Judge Boyle 
serve on one of the few courts that post judges‟ conflict lists on their web sites. 
Both judges had been nominated to their respective courts of appeals. Judge Payne 
withdrew as a nominee, largely because of the conflict-of-interest accusations; 
Judge Boyle was not confirmed to the appellate court (though the alleged conflicts 
were not the major issue).  
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The new controversies did not lead the Judicial Conference to require 
adoption of the Iowa model, but in September 2006 the Conference took action of 
a different kind: it called upon all federal courts (except for the Supreme Court, 
over which the Conference has no jurisdiction) to institute “automatic conflict 
screening” using standardized hardware and software. The new policy – to be 
implemented and directed by the circuit councils – will require all federal judges 
to “develop a list identifying financial conflicts for use in conflict screening, [to] 
review and update the list at regular intervals, and [to] employ the list personally 
or with the assistance of court staff to participate in automated conflict 
screening.”19  
The Judicial Conference initiative was widely applauded, and we can hope 
that the new policy will reduce to a minimum the instances in which judges 
participate in cases involving corporations or other entities in which they own 
stock. But only time will tell whether a purely internal mechanism will do the job 
effectively or whether, as the Chairman and Ranking Member suggested, external 
monitoring is a necessary supplement. Moreover, a purely internal screening 
program does not serve the interest in transparency. Transparency instills 
confidence and thus has value apart from the instrumental goal of minimizing 
inadvertent conflicts.  
B. Other issues relating to disqualification and conflict of interest 
Except for the “financial interest” provision, the specific prohibitions of § 
455(b) seldom become the subject of media coverage, nor have they given rise to 
an extensive body of reported decisions. This is so in part because the other 
                                              
19 See Judicial Conference Policy on Mandatory Conflict Screening, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/report906appendixa.pdf. 
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circumstances that require recusal occur less frequently than financial conflicts, 
and in part because the criteria are easily applied. For example, under § 455(b)(2), 
a judge must not sit on a case if “in private practice he served as lawyer in the 
matter in controversy.” But after a judge has been on the bench for several years, 
such cases will be rare. Nor will there be many cases in which a judge must recuse 
because he or she “has served in governmental employment and in such capacity 
participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding.”20 
The statute also requires recusal where a judge or a close relative is a party to the 
proceeding or is acting as a lawyer in it. Circumstances of that kind will generally 
be so obvious that recusal will be immediate, automatic, and not worthy of notice 
anywhere outside the docket sheet. 
A different situation is presented by § 455(b)(1), which provides that a judge 
must disqualify himself “[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a 
party.” One would not expect to see many cases in which a federal judge was 
found to have an actual “personal bias or prejudice concerning a party,” and one 
                                              
20 Early in his tenure on the Supreme Court, then-Associate Justice Rehnquist denied a 
motion for disqualification based on testimony he had given at a Congressional hearing during his 
service as head of the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice. See Laird v. Tatum, 
409 U.S. 824 (1972) (memorandum of Rehnquist, J.). At that time the statute did not have the 
specific reference to “governmental employment.” Justice Rehnquist first focused on the 
“mandatory” provision that required disqualification “in any case in which [the judge] has been of 
counsel, [or] is or has been a material witness.” That provision was inapplicable, he said, because 
“I have neither been of counsel nor have I been a material witness in Laird v. Tatum.” Id. at 828. 
Justice Rehnquist then turned to the statutory language that required recusal where the judge “is 
so related to or connected with any party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, 
for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein.” Based on an extensive review of 
prior practice, Justice Rehnquist concluded: “My impression is that none of the former Justices of 
this Court since 1911 have followed a practice of disqualifying themselves in cases involving 
points of law with respect to which they had expressed an opinion or formulated policy prior to 
ascending to the bench.” Id. at 831. Justice Rehnquist‟s refusal to recuse in Laird v. Tatum has 
been severely criticized. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 
Brooklyn L. Rev. 589 (1987).  
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does not. As the Seventh Circuit said more than 20 years ago, “The 
disqualification of a judge for actual bias or prejudice is a serious matter, and it 
should be required only when the bias or prejudice is proved by compelling 
evidence.”21 That is an extremely stringent standard, and, not surprisingly, there 
are few decisions holding that a litigant has made the necessary showing.  
As a practical matter, however, the difficulty of proving actual bias under § 
455(b)(1) counts for little. The reason is that the concerns that underlie § 455(b)(1) 
are served by reliance on § 455(a), which requires disqualification “in any 
proceeding in which [a judge‟s] impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” The 
courts have held that § 455(a) “adopts the objective standard of a reasonable 
observer.”22 To be sure, the reasonable observer is one who is “fully informed of 
the underlying facts.” As the Second Circuit has said, “the existence of the 
appearance of impropriety is to be determined „not by considering what a straw 
poll of the only partly informed man-in-the-street would show, but by examining 
the record facts and the law, and then deciding whether a reasonable person 
knowing and understanding all the relevant facts would recuse the judge.‟”23 But 
the courts also stress that “the hypothetical reasonable observer is not the judge 
himself or a judicial colleague but a person outside the judicial system.”24 This 
external perspective elevates the standard at least to some degree, because “these 
outside observers are less inclined to credit judges‟ impartiality and mental 
discipline than the judiciary itself will be.”25 
                                              
21 United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1202 (7th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added). 
22 United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 126 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J.).  
23 Id. at 126-27 (emphasis added) (internal brackets omitted). 
24 United States v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279, 287 (4th Cir. 1998).  
25 Matter of Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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As a corollary of this approach, the courts are careful to emphasize that a 
finding that recusal is required under § 455(a) is not tantamount to saying that the 
judge harbors actual prejudice toward a litigant or class of litigants. Typical is this 
statement by the Third Circuit: “We underscore that we are not intimating that 
Judge Kelly actually harbors any illegitimate pro-plaintiff bias. The problem, 
however, is that regardless of his actual impartiality, a reasonable person might 
perceive bias to exist, and this cannot be permitted.”26 In one high-profile case, the 
Eighth Circuit went so far as to say that “we have every confidence that” the judge 
would “handle the case in a fair and impartial manner.”27 But that did not negate 
the necessity for reassigning the case based on “the risk of a perception of judicial 
bias or partiality.”  
The statute‟s focus on the reasonable observer‟s perception of bias led the 
Supreme Court to conclude that when the circumstances create an appearance of 
partiality, recusal is required under § 455(a) “even when a judge lacks actual 
knowledge of the facts indicating his interest or bias in the case.”28 The case was 
Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., and it involved a district judge 
whose failures of memory were aptly characterized by the Court as 
“remarkable.”29 The Court rejected the argument that its interpretation of the 
statute “[calls] upon judges to perform the impossible – to disqualify themselves 
                                              
26 In re School Asbestos Litigation, 977 F.2d 764, 782 (3d Cir. 1992).  
27 United States v. Tucker, 78 F.3d 1313, 1325 (8th Cir. 1996). The case involved an 
indictment brought by Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr. The court noted the judge‟s 
connections with President and Mrs. Clinton and the Clintons‟ connection to the defendant.  
28 Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860 (1988) (quoting the 
opinion below). 
29 Id. at 865; see also id. at 866 (noting “unfortunate coincidence” that although judge 
“regularly attended” meetings of the board of trustees of a university affected by the case before 
him, he did not attend the meeting at which the transaction was discussed). 
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based on facts they do not know.”30 Rather, the statutory requirement comes into 
play when the judge learns of the disqualifying facts; the judge is then “called 
upon to rectify an oversight and to take the steps necessary to maintain public 
confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary.” If the judge fails to do so, relief 
from judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be 
available. In the case before it, the Court found that the circumstances were so 
suspicious that the court of appeals was justified in reopening the closed litigation 
and ordering a new trial.31 By way of postscript, three years after the Court‟s 
decision, the judge whose memory allegedly failed him – Robert F. Collins – was 
convicted of bribery in an unrelated criminal prosecution. He resigned from the 
bench and thereby avoided impeachment.32  
The body of decisions applying § 455(a) is large and varied. Occasionally a 
court of appeals uses the case before it as a vehicle to establish a rule applicable to 
an entire class of cases. For example, the Third Circuit exercised its supervisory 
power to require that district judges within the circuit recuse themselves “from 
participating in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition of a defendant raising 
any issue concerning the trial or conviction over which that judge presided in his 
or her former capacity as a state court judge.”33 But that kind of categorical 
rulemaking is rare. Ordinarily, recusal motions under § 455(a) “are fact driven,” 
and the outcome will depend on the court‟s “independent examination of the 
                                              
30 Id. at 861. 
31 Id. at 865-70. Although the Court purported to accept the District Court‟s finding that the 
judge “did not have actual knowledge of” the relevant facts, id. at 864, the opinion as a whole 
gives the strong impression that the Justices in the majority believed otherwise.  
32 See infra Part II-A. 
33 Clemmons v. Wolfe, 377 F.3d 322, 329 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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unique facts and circumstances of the particular claim at issue.”34 A few examples 
will be sufficient to give a sense of the kinds of judicial behavior that have 
generated published appellate or district court opinions.35  
A divided panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that a district 
judge should have recused herself from a criminal case where the record showed 
“no small amount of resentment and animosity, if not blind hatred,” between a 
close personal friend of the judge and the defendant.36 The Third Circuit (also over 
a dissent) ordered a district judge to disqualify himself from further participation 
in complex asbestos-related bankruptcy litigation because of his close relationship 
with certain “consulting Advisors” who themselves had a conflict of interest.37 In 
several cases, the courts of appeals have found that public comments by district 
judges have given rise to reasonable questions about the judges‟ partiality, thus 
requiring recusal under section 455(a). Noteworthy examples are cases involving 
an abortion protest in Kansas,38 racial assignments in the Boston public schools,39 
and the Government‟s antitrust suit against Microsoft Corp.40 In a prominent 
                                              
34 United States v. Bremers, 195 F.3d 221, 226 (5th Cir. 1999).  
35 Because the Federal Judicial Center monograph provides a thorough summary of the 
cases applying § 455(a), the discussion here is illustrative rather than comprehensive.  See FJC 
Recusal Study, supra note 11, at 15-41. 
36 United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 156 (5th Cir. 1995). 
37 In re Kensington, Int‟l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289 (3d Cir. 2004). The court explained: “The 
gravamen of the Petitions is that Judge Wolin was tainted by the involvement of two court-
appointed advisors who, at the same time that they were supposed to be giving neutral advice in 
the Five Asbestos Cases, represented a class of tort claimants in another, unrelated asbestos-
driven bankruptcy and espoused views therein on the same disputed issues that are at the core of 
the Five Asbestos Cases.” Shortly after the Third Circuit removed Judge Wolin from the asbestos 
case, the judge resigned from the bench and entered private practice.  
38 United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985 (10th Cir. 1993).  
39 In re Boston‟s Children First, 244 F.3d 164 (1st Cir. 2001).  
40 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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Florida environmental case, the chief judge of the district court granted a motion 
to disqualify a district judge who had made a series of comments to newspapers 
manifesting apparent bias against the parties on one side of the litigation.41  
On the other side, the Seventh Circuit held that a district judge was not 
required to recuse himself from hearing a Voting Rights Act suit even though he 
had made political contributions to two of the defendant officials before his 
appointment to the federal bench.42 The court said that, as a general matter, “pre-
judicial” political activity should not be viewed as “prejudicial.” The Second 
Circuit found that a district judge acted appropriately in presiding over a narcotics 
trial seven months after giving a videotaped lecture to a governmental task force in 
which she advised the assembled agents and prosecutors about steps they could 
take to increase the prospects for conviction in narcotics cases.43 The court 
emphasized two significant countervailing facts: the lecture to the task force 
“included several emphatic criticisms of prosecutors;” and the judge also gave a 
lecture to criminal defense lawyers. A few years later, the same court held that a 
district judge was not required to recuse himself from hearing an environmental 
case against Texaco, Inc., after attending an expense-paid seminar on 
environmental issues sponsored by an organization that received some funding 
from Texaco.44 The court relied on the “indirect and minor funding role” that 
Texaco played and on “the lack of a showing that any aspect of the seminar 
touched upon an issue material to the disposition of a claim or defense in the 
                                              
41 United States v. South Florida Water Management Dist., 290 F.Supp.2d 1356 (S.D. Fla. 
2003).  
42 Matter of Mason, 916 F.3d 384 (7th Cir. 1990). 
43 United States v. Pitera, 5 F.3d 624, 626-27 (2d Cir. 1993).  
44 In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 2000).  
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present litigation.”45 Although the court said that the outcome of the case was “not 
in doubt,” the panel wrote “at some length” to provide judges with “general 
guidance as to when attendance at meetings, seminars, or other presentations may 
be problematic.”46 
An important limitation on § 455(a) was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in 
the 1994 decision in Liteky v. United States.47 The Court held in Liteky that the 
so-called “extrajudicial source” doctrine applies to § 455(a). Although the Court 
asserted that “there is not much doctrine to the doctrine,”48 the opinion makes it 
very difficult for a litigant to secure recusal without relying on an “extrajudicial 
source.” This follows from two propositions endorsed by the Court: 
First, judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a 
bias or partiality motion. In and of themselves (i.e., apart from 
surrounding comments or accompanying opinion), they ... can only in the 
rarest circumstances evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism 
required ... when no extrajudicial source is involved. ... Second, opinions 
formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in 
the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not 
constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-
seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment 
impossible.49 
Given this language, it is predictable that “courts of appeals rarely reverse refusals 
to recuse when the alleged partiality did not derive from an extrajudicial source.”50  
                                              
45 Id. at 198. 
46 Id. at 202. 
47 510 U.S. 540 (1994).  
48 Id. at 554.  
49 Id. at 555 (citation omitted).  
50 FJC Recusal Study, supra note 11, at 21. 
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The Court in Liteky was careful, however, to distinguish between rulings by 
a judge and comments that a judge might make incident to a ruling. In rare cases, 
comments in the course of a judicial proceeding can demonstrate bias requiring 
recusal. The point is illustrated by a recent Tenth Circuit decision involving a 
colloquy at a sentencing hearing following a plea agreement. The trial judge said, 
“I will not put up with this from these Hispanics or anybody else, any other 
defendants.” This was followed by another reference to “a Hispanic defendant” 
who was “lying” to the judge. The court of appeals held that the judge should have 
recused himself sua sponte, saying, “The judge‟s statements on the record would 
cause a reasonable person to harbor doubts about his impartiality, without regard 
to whether the judge actually harbored bias against [the defendant] on account of 
his Hispanic heritage.”51 
In another recent criminal case, the dissenting judge on a Third Circuit panel 
argued that the district judge‟s judicial rulings, combined with questionable ex 
parte advocacy by the prosecution, sufficed to require recusal under the Liteky 
standard. The defendant in the case was Dr. Cyril Wecht, the well-known forensic 
pathologist. Wecht asserted that the charges against him were politically motivated 
and that a reasonable “man in the street” might perceive that “the Government and 
the court were actually in league.”52 The dissenting judge agreed that the record 
showed an appearance of partiality:  
The circumstances of this case present the rare occasion when a 
judge‟s judicial rulings demonstrate the appearance of bias because they 
began with and were possibly tainted by improper, or at least highly 
questionable, ex parte advocacy by the Government. This ex parte 
                                              
51 United States v. Franco-Guillen, 196 Fed. Appx. 716, 719 (10th Cir. 2006).  
52 Petition for Mandamus at 49, 27, United States v. Wecht (Dkt. No. 06-3704) (on file with 
author).  
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art57
 Hellman – Judicial Ethics Page 17 
 R9 September 20, 2007  
advocacy was tantamount to an extrajudicial source and permeated the 
rulings of the District Court such that one cannot avoid discerning the 
appearance of partiality.53 
However, the panel majority, although criticizing some of the district judge‟s 
actions and comments, found that the defendant had “fail[ed] to demonstrate the 
„high degree of favoritism or antagonism‟ that is required under Liteky.”54  
As these citations illustrate, a trial judge‟s refusal to recuse is subject to 
appellate review.55 Sometimes, as in the Tenth Circuit case involving comments 
about Hispanics, the issue is raised on appeal from a final judgment. More often, 
as in the Wecht prosecution, the party seeking recusal files an interlocutory appeal. 
“All courts of appeals permit a party to seek interlocutory review via mandamus, 
reasoning that, at least in some cases, the damage to public confidence in the 
justice system (or perhaps to the litigants) would not be undone by post-judgment 
appeal.”56 Except in the Seventh Circuit, the courts of appeals apply an “abuse of 
discretion” standard.57 On occasion, the reviewing court, rather than requiring a 
judge to step down from a case, will suggest that the judge reconsider his refusal 
to recuse.58  
                                              
53 United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 227 (3d Cir. 2007) (Bright, J., dissenting). 
54 Id. at 220. 
55 Occasionally, as in the Florida environmental case discussed in the text, a trial judge will 
refer a recusal motion to another judge of the district court rather than deciding the question 
himself or herself.  
56 FJC Recusal Study, supra note 11, at 68. 
57 Id. at 65.  
58 See, e.g., Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 648-49 (8th Cir. 2002) (en banc). This decision 
led to an ugly public dispute between the district judge – Charles A. Shaw of the Eastern District 
of Missouri – and the court of appeals. On remand from the Eighth Circuit, Judge Shaw recused 
himself but wrote an angry opinion asserting that “race played a role in the [en banc] majority‟s 
decision.” Moran v. Clarke, 213 F.Supp.2d 1067, 1075 (E.D. Mo. 2002). The Eighth Circuit 
responded with a unanimous en banc opinion that sharply rebuked the judge for his “baseless, 
personal, racially oriented speculations” that violated “the district court‟s own solemn obligation 
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When a Justice of the United States Supreme Court denies a motion to 
recuse, appellate review is not available. Indeed, under the Court‟s practice, 
decisions about recusal are made solely by the Justice whose participation is being 
challenged; the other members of the Court play no part (unless the Justice 
chooses to consult them).59 On occasion, Justices write opinions explaining why 
they have declined to disqualify themselves. In 2003 Justice Scalia published a 
lengthy opinion explaining why he denied a motion to recuse himself in a case 
involving Vice President Cheney.60 The motion was based on news reports about a 
duck hunting trip in which Justice Scalia and the Vice President participated.61  
An unusual episode involving the possibility of recusal by Justice Stephen G. 
Breyer came to light early in 2005. Justice Breyer had served as counsel to the 
Senate Judiciary Committee in the 1970s when Congress was considering the 
legislation that became the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA). Later he 
served as a member of the commission that formulated the initial set of Sentencing 
Guidelines. Now, in 2004, the Supreme Court was poised to hear cases that would 
determine the validity of the Guidelines under the Sixth Amendment. Was Justice 
Breyer required to recuse himself from taking part in the decisions? Uncertain, he 
consulted an academic expert on legal ethics, Professor Stephen Gillers. Gillers 
                                                                                                                                       
[to] uphold the integrity of the judiciary.” Moran v. Clarke, 309 F.3d 516, 518 (8th Cir. 2002) (en 
banc) (per curiam). 
59 As then-Justice Rehnquist put it, “generally the Court as an institution leaves 
[disqualification] motions, even though they be addressed to it, to the decision of the individual 
Justices to whom they refer.” Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 1301 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.) .  
60 Cheney v. United States District Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (Scalia, J.). 
61 Some academics are troubled by the absence of a procedure for review of a Justice‟s 
decision not to recuse. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 20; Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox Guarding 
the Hen House?: Recusal and the Procedural Void in the Court of Last Resort, 57 Rutgers L. Rev. 
107 (2004).   
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concluded that there was “no … reasonable basis to question [Justice Breyer‟s] 
impartiality,” and that the Justice could participate in the cases. Other experts 
argued that Justice Breyer should not have played a role in “deciding on the life or 
death of his own brainchild.”62  
C. Reassignment “to preserve the appearance of justice”  
Independent of section 455, when a case is remanded for further proceedings 
in the district court, the court of appeals has power to order that the case be 
reassigned to a different judge. This authority comes from 28 USC § 2106, which 
provides in general terms that all federal appellate courts, in reviewing cases, may 
“require such further proceedings … as may be just under the circumstances.” 
When Judge Manuel Real testified at the House Judiciary impeachment hearing, 
he emphasized that “I have never been sanctioned for any judicial misconduct.” 
That was correct, but on several occasions the court of appeals had reassigned 
Judge Real‟s cases “to preserve the appearance of justice.” In one of the cases 
Judge Real denied a litigant‟s motions before they were even filed; the record also 
reflected “incidents of animosity” toward the party‟s counsel.63 The court of 
appeals thus used § 2106 as a device for enforcing an ethical standard almost 
identical to that of § 455(a).64 The court did so again a few weeks after the 
                                              
62 Tony Mauro, Breyer Sought Advice on Whether to Recuse in Sentencing Case, Legal 
Times, Jan. 18, 2005. 
63 Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Cincom Systems, Inc., 2000 WL 1023224 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(table opinion reported at 232 F.3d 893).  
64 The court acted similarly in a criminal case, albeit without explicitly invoking § 2106. The 
court found that “Judge Real exceeded his authority” in staying a bail order entered by a 
magistrate judge in another judicial district. The court‟s order continued: “Because of the 
appearance of bias, the Chief Judge of the District Court ... shall assign the matter ... to a judge 
other than Judge Real.” Nicherie v. United States District Court, Dkt. No. 04-71066 (Mar. 9, 
2004) (on file with the author). See Paul Lieberman & David Rosenzweig, Judicial Battle Erupts 
Over Suspect‟s Release, L.A. Times, Mar. 11, 2004. 
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impeachment hearing. It found that Judge Real, presiding over an employment 
discrimination suit, “fail[ed] faithfully to apply our prior decision in [the] case.” 
The court acknowledged that the plaintiff had not satisfied the “demanding” test 
for proving actual judicial bias, but it ordered reassignment under § 2106 “to 
preserve the appearance of justice.”65 
Other courts of appeals have invoked their supervisory authority and § 2106 
in a variety of circumstances involving evidence of bias or antagonism on the part 
of a district judge.66 For example, the District of Columbia Circuit removed 
District Judge Royce C. Lamberth, Jr., from a long-running case brought by 
beneficiaries of Indian land trusts against the Department of the Interior as their 
trustee. The court found that Judge Lamberth had made a “parade of serious 
charges” against the Department, including accusations of racism, “all 
unconnected to the issues before the district court.”67 The court also relied on an 
“unbroken string” of reversals, including one ruling in which the district court 
“both assumed the mantle of a prosecutor and authorized biased investigations.” 
The Fifth Circuit removed District Judge Samuel Fred Biery, Jr., from a criminal 
case “because of [the] judge‟s brazen antagonism to both the tenets of the 
[sentencing] guidelines and to [the defendant].”68 The appellate court condemned 
Judge Biery‟s behavior in extraordinarily strong language: “we remove the district 
                                              
65 Obrey v. England, 215 Fed. Appx. 621 (9th Cir. 2006).  
66 In the Seventh Circuit, reassignment is the norm in any case tried by the district court. See 
7th Cir. R. 36; Cange v. Stotler & Co., 913 F.2d 1204, 1207-08 (7th Cir. 1990). The court of 
appeals thus avoids having to determine whether particular circumstances suggest “any bias or 
mindset” on the part of the district judge. Id.  
67 Cobell v. Kempthorne, 455 F.3d 317, 334 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
68 United States v. Andrews, 390 F.3d 840, 851 (5th Cir. 2004).  
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judge from this case because he has breached the barrier between the rule of law 
and the exercise of personal caprice.” 
It is not clear whether the Liteky guidelines apply to the exercise of 
supervisory power by courts of appeals under § 2106. The Supreme Court said in 
Liteky that § 2106 “may permit a different standard,”69 and courts of appeals have 
sometimes ordered reassignment of cases based on an appearance of bias created 
by a judge‟s prior rulings in the proceedings under review.70  
D. Financial-interest disqualification in perspective 
At first blush, the disqualification statutes may appear schizophrenic in their 
application. On the one hand, the hundreds of decisions applying § 455(a) look 
closely at the particular circumstances and ask whether “a reasonable person 
knowing and understanding all the relevant facts would recuse the judge.”71 Thus, 
when Dr. Cyril H. Wecht filed a petition for mandamus seeking to disqualify 
District Judge Arthur Schwab from presiding over his criminal fraud prosecution, 
the appellate panel considered the case for seven months before issuing a lengthy 
decision rejecting the request on a 2-1 vote.72 On the other hand, a financial 
interest always requires recusal even if no reasonable person would fear bias on 
the particular facts – for example, where the judge owns a few shares of stock in a 
large publicly held corporation and the case barely meets the jurisdictional 
minimum.   
                                              
69 Liteky, 510 U.S. at 554.  
70 E.g., Nicherie, supra note 64; United States v. Londono, 100 F.3d 236, 242-43 (2d Cir. 
1996), abrogated on other grounds.  
71 See supra text accompanying note 23 (emphasis added).  
72 United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 2007), discussed supra Part I-B. 
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The discrepancy exists, but for good reasons. Section 455(a) is necessarily 
fact-intensive, because no formula can adequately capture the varieties of judicial 
behavior that might cause a reasonable person to question a judge‟s impartiality. 
At the same time, there is sound justification for retaining the absolute rule for 
financial interests. Even with that rule, judges have had difficulty keeping track of 
their investments and recusing where a conflict exists. Without a bright-line rule, 
screening for conflicts would require a much more elaborate mechanism. And 
monitoring by litigants, outside observers, and the judiciary itself would be a much 
more complex undertaking. The absolute prohibition made good sense when 
Congress revised the statute in 1974; it makes good sense today.  
II. Operation of the Misconduct Statutes 
For most of the nation‟s history, the only formal procedure for dealing with 
misconduct by federal judges was the cumbersome process of impeachment.73 
Criminal prosecution was a theoretical possibility, but up to 1980, “no sitting 
federal judge was ever prosecuted and convicted of a crime committed while in 
office.”74 A 1939 statute created judicial councils within the circuits, but their 
                                              
73 From 1789 through 1980, only 10 federal judges were impeached by the House. Four 
(Chase, Peck, Swayne, and Louderback) were acquitted by the Senate. Two (Delahay and 
English) resigned before the Senate held an impeachment trial. Four judges were convicted and 
removed from office (Pickering, Humphries, Archbald, and Ritter). For a detailed account, see 
Emily Field Van Tassel & Paul Finkelman, Impeachable Offenses: A Documentary History from 
1787 to the Present (1999). 
74 Report of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, 152 F.R.D. 265, 
326 (1993) [hereinafter National Commission Report]. In 1939, Judge Martin T. Manton of the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals was convicted of crimes committed while he served as a federal 
judge, but he resigned from the bench before the criminal prosecution began. See Joseph Borkin, 
The Corrupt Judge 27, 45 (1962). Since 1980, four federal judges have been convicted by juries 
of crimes committed while in office. Two (Claiborne and Nixon) were impeached and removed 
from office; the other two (Collins and Aguilar) resigned from the bench. See Part II-A infra.  
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powers were vaguely defined, particularly with respect to authority over individual 
judges.75 
That era ended with the enactment of the Judicial Councils Reform and 
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 (to give it its full name).76 The 1980 
law was the product of compromise. Powerful members of the Senate favored a 
much more radical proposal, one that would have created a new national tribunal 
with power to remove judges who had committed serious misconduct. However, 
the Judiciary Committee leadership in the House was deeply skeptical of this 
approach. Ultimately the two Houses agreed on a more modest measure.  The new 
law created a regime that has aptly been described as one of “decentralized self-
regulation.”77 Codified as section 372(c) of the Judicial Code, it established a new 
set of procedures for judicial discipline and vested primary responsibility for 
implementing them in the federal judicial circuits.78 
                                              
75 See Peter Graham Fish, The Politics of Federal Judicial Administration 417-26 (1973); 
Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74 (1969). 
76 As the name suggests, the Act, in addition to establishing a formal process for dealing 
with allegations of judicial misconduct, sought to reinvigorate the circuit judicial councils as 
instruments of circuit governance. See generally Robert H. Hall, Federal Circuit Judicial 
Councils: A Legislative History and Revisions Needed Today, 11 Ga. St. L. Rev. 1 (1994).  
77 Jeffrey N. Barr & Thomas E. Willging, Decentralized Self-Regulation, Accountability, 
and Judicial Independence Under the Federal Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 142 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 25, 29 (1993) [hereinafter Barr & Willging]. 
78 Unfortunately, the most readily available primary source for the legislative history of the 
1980 Act contains only the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee on S. 1873, the 1979 bill 
that would have created a new Court on Judicial Conduct and Disability. See 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
4315. For an authoritative exposition of the legislation Congress enacted, one must look at the 
House Report, H.R. Rep. No. 96-1313 (1980). See also Stephen B. Burbank, Procedural 
Rulemaking under the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 
131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 283, 291-308 (1982) (recounting the origins of the 1980 Act).  
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A. Evolution of the regulatory framework 
One element of the compromise that produced the 1980 Act was the 
assurance of continuing legislative oversight.79 Consistent with this commitment, 
Congress in 1990 enacted a modest package of amendments to the statute. The 
same legislation also created a National Commission on Judicial Discipline and 
Removal. In 1993 the National Commission published a thorough report as well as 
an extensive compilation of working papers.80 Particularly noteworthy are the 
studies carried out at the Commission‟s behest by the Federal Judicial Center and 
by Professor Richard Marcus.81 These studies constitute a rich source of detailed 
information that is enormously useful in showing how the 1980 Act was being 
implemented at the everyday operational level during its first decade. 
The next major step in Congress‟s performance of its oversight role came in 
2001 when a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing on 
the “operation of [the] federal misconduct statutes.”82 Following the hearing, 
Chairman Coble and Ranking Member Berman introduced the Judicial 
Improvements Act of 2002. Their bill became law in late 2002.83 The legislation 
further revised the provisions governing the handling of complaints against judges, 
                                              
79 For example, when the House passed the final version of the legislation, Congressman 
Robert W. Kastenmeier stated: “[B]oth the House and the Senate Judiciary Committees believe 
that there should be a continuing dialog between the legislative and judicial branches, and 
vigorous oversight by Congress.” 126 Cong. Rec. 28617 (1980). Rep. Kastenmeier was the 
sponsor and principal drafter of the compromise bill.  
80 See National Commission Report, supra note 74. 
81 See Barr & Willging, supra note 77; Richard Marcus, Who Should Discipline Federal 
Judges, and How? 149 F.R.D. 375 (1993). 
82 2001 House Misconduct Hearing, supra note 16. 
83 The legislation was enacted as part of the 21st Century Department of Justice 
Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273. The standalone version was passed by 
the House in July 2002 as H.R. 3892. For the legislative history, see H.R. Rep. 107-459 (2002). 
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primarily by codifying some of the procedures adopted by the judiciary through 
rulemaking. The new law also gave the judicial misconduct provisions their own 
chapter in the United States Code, Chapter 16. 
Congress returned to the subject of judicial misconduct in 2006. Chairman 
James Sensenbrenner of the House Judiciary Committee introduced legislation to 
create an Inspector General for the Judicial Branch.84 The primary task of the new 
Office would have been to “conduct investigations of ... possible misconduct in 
office of judges ... that may require oversight or other action within the Judicial 
Branch or by Congress.”85 A hearing was held on the bill, and an amended version 
was approved by the House Judiciary Committee, but the legislation died with the 
109th Congress.86  
In addition to evaluating and revising the laws governing judicial 
misconduct, Congress has continued to perform its constitutional role of 
considering impeachment of judges who are alleged to have committed “high 
crimes or misdemeanors.” In the late 1980s, three federal judges were impeached 
and removed from office – Judge Harry E. Claiborne of Nevada (1986), Judge 
                                              
84 H.R. 5219, 109th Cong. (2006). Chairman Sensenbrenner had been thinking about the 
subject for more than two years. For example, in remarks to the Judicial Conference of the United 
States in 2004, he raised the question “whether the disciplinary authority delegated to the 
Judiciary has been responsibly exercised and ought to continue.” Sensenbrenner Remarks Before 
the U.S. Judicial Conference Regarding Congressional Oversight Responsibility of the Judiciary 
(Mar. 17, 2004) (on file with the author). He referred to the “decidedly mixed record” of the 
judiciary in investigating and imposing appropriate discipline for misconduct.  
85 H.R. 5219, § 2. See Judicial Transparency and Ethics Enhancement Act of 2006: Hearing 
on H.R. 5219 Before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the 
House Committee on the Judiciary (2006) [hereinafter 2006 Judicial Transparency Hearing]. 
Senator Chuck Grassley introduced a companion measure in the Senate. S. 2678, 109th Cong. 
(2006). No hearings were held on that bill.  
86 A new bill has been introduced in the 110th Congress, along with a companion Senate 
measure. See H.R. 785, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 461, 110th Cong. (2007).  
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Alcee L. Hastings of Florida (1989), and Judge Walter L. Nixon of Mississippi 
(also 1989). All had engaged in conduct that involved criminality or corruption.87 
In 1993, the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Jack Brooks (D. Tex.), 
took steps to initiate impeachment proceedings against District Judge Robert F. 
Collins, who had been convicted of bribery and obstruction of justice.88 Before a 
hearing could be held, the judge resigned from the bench.89 As already noted, in 
2006 a resolution of impeachment was introduced against District Judge Manuel 
L. Real. A hearing was held, but the proceedings went no further, in part because a 
new inquiry was moving forward within the judicial branch.90  
The judiciary too has taken steps to fill in the contours of the misconduct 
legislation. In 1986 a committee of chief circuit judges prepared a set of 
Illustrative Rules Governing Judicial Misconduct and Disability. These Rules, 
accompanied by an extensive commentary, addressed many procedural and 
substantive issues that were not resolved by the statute itself. A revised set of 
Illustrative Rules was promulgated by the Administrative Office of United States 
                                              
87 See Real Impeachment Hearing, supra note 2, at 123 (statement of Professor Arthur D. 
Hellman). For a detailed account, see Van Tassel & Finkelman, supra note 73.  
88 See United States v. Collins, 972 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1992). The impeachment resolution 
was H. Res. 207, 103d Cong. (1993). Judge Collins was the subject of the Supreme Court 
decision in Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988), discussed supra 
Part I-B. 
89 Mary Jacoby, Judge Resigns and Kills Impeachment Hearings, Roll Call, Aug. 12, 1993 
(available on NEXIS, News library). An impeachment resolution was also introduced against 
Judge Robert P. Aguilar after he was convicted of endeavoring to obstruct justice and illegally 
disclosing a wiretap application. H. Res. 177, 103d Cong. (1993) (Rep. Sensenbrenner). Both 
convictions were ultimately overturned on appeal, but Judge Aguilar resigned from the bench in 
exchange for the Government‟s agreement not to pursue the prosecution further. See Eric Slater, 
U.S. Drops Case Against Judge, Who Resigns, L.A. Times, June 25, 1996, at A3 (available on 
NEXIS, News library).  
90 See infra note 174 and accompanying text. 
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Courts in 2000.91 Most of the circuits have adopted rules based on the Illustrative 
Rules. 
Perhaps more important than the procedural details in the Rules is the 
philosophy that the document articulates. The commentary to Rule 1 states that the 
purpose of the 1980 law “is essentially forward-looking and not punitive. The 
emphasis is on correction of conditions that interfere with the proper 
administration of justice in the courts.”92 This is not necessarily the impression 
that one would get from the legislative history of the Act.93 But the Illustrative 
Rules‟ rejection of a “punitive” purpose has been widely influential in the 
administration of the misconduct statutes.94  
In 2004, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist appointed a committee chaired 
by Justice Stephen Breyer to assess how the Judicial Branch has administered the 
1980 Act and whether “there are any real problems” in its implementation. The 
Breyer Committee issued a lengthy and detailed public report in September 
2006.95 The committee‟s findings will be summarized later in this article.  
                                              
91 Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Illustrative Rules Governing 
Complaints of Judicial Misconduct and Disability (2000) [hereinafter Illustrative Rules]. 
92 Id. at 2. 
93 To be sure, there was support for the Illustrative Rules‟ approach. For example, key 
players in both the House and the Senate quoted an American Bar Association report stating that 
“[t]he major purpose of judicial discipline is not to punish judges ....” See 126 Cong. Rec. 28091 
(Sen. DeConcini); id. at 25370 (Rep. Railsback). But at least in the Senate, much attention 
focused on devising an alternative to impeachment as a means of disciplining judges who engage 
in misconduct. This may be forward-looking, but it is also punitive. 
94 For example, the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council emphasized the language quoted in the 
text when it endorsed the dismissal of a complaint against Judge Real alleging the same 
misconduct that was the subject of the impeachment hearing. See In re Complaint of Judicial 
Misconduct, 425 F.3d 1179, 1182 (Judicial Council of Ninth Circuit 2005). 
95 Judicial Conduct and Disability Act Study Committee, Implementation of the Judicial 
Conduct and Disability Act of 1980: A Report to the Chief Justice, 239 F.R.D. 116 (2006) 
[hereinafter Breyer Committee Report].  
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In July 2007, the Judicial Conference of the United States published a draft 
of a new set of “Rules Governing Judicial Conduct and Disability Proceedings 
Undertaken Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364.”96 The primary thrust of the 
proposed rules is to implement the Breyer Committee‟s recommendations. The 
Judicial Conference invited comments on the draft and scheduled a public hearing 
in September 2007. When promulgated in their final form, the new rules will 
govern all proceedings under the Act.  
A striking feature of the post-1980 history is the central role of the House 
Judiciary Committee and its leadership. The 1990 amendments originated with 
that Committee, as did the amendments in 2002. A request from two key 
Committee members in 2002 prompted the Federal Judicial Center to carry out a 
valuable supplementary study of how the Act was being implemented.97 Chief 
Justice Rehnquist appointed the Breyer Committee in response to criticism by 
Chairman Sensenbrenner about the handling of several complaints against 
judges.98  
B. What constitutes “misconduct”?  
Chapter 16 of the Judicial Code delineates the procedures for dealing with 
possible misconduct by federal judges.99 The definition of misconduct in § 351(a) 
                                              
96 http://www.uscourts.gov/library/judicialmisconduct/Rules_DraftPublicComment.pdf 
[hereinafter Proposed Misconduct Rules]. 
97 See Jeffrey N. Barr & Thomas E. Willging, Statement of Allegations and Reasons in 
Chief Judge Dismissal Orders Under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 (Federal 
Judicial Center 2002). 
98 The committee was appointed in May 2004, just two months after Chairman 
Sensenbrenner, at a meeting presided over by the Chief Justice, pointedly commented on the 
“decidedly mixed record” of the judiciary in administering the 1980 Act. See supra note 84. 
99 The procedures in Chapter 16 also provide the channel for raising concerns about mental 
or physical disability on the part of a judge. That aspect of the statutory scheme is outside the 
scope of this article, but two points deserve brief mention. First, the Breyer Committee found that 
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is as open-ended as it is terse: “conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious 
administration of the business of the courts.” In practice, however, the vagueness 
of the statutory language is mitigated in two ways. 
First, Chapter 16 itself contains a significant limitation on the potential scope 
of the statute‟s application. Section 352(b)(1) authorizes the chief judge to dismiss 
complaints that are “directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural 
ruling.” The purpose of this limitation, as the Breyer Committee has explained, is 
“to protect the independence of the judge in the course of deciding Article III 
cases and controversies.”100 Circuit web sites typically underscore the point by 
warning would-be complainants that misconduct “does not include making wrong 
decisions – even very wrong decisions – in cases.”101 The courts add, by way of 
further emphasis:  
The complaint procedure is not intended to provide a means of 
obtaining review of a judge‟s decision or ruling in a case. The judicial 
council of the circuit, the body that takes action under the complaint 
procedure, does not have the power to change a decision or ruling; only a 
court can do that.102  
“Merits-related,” in this context, includes a judge‟s failure to recuse. On this point, 
too, court web sites are explicit: “The complaint procedure may not be used to 
have a judge disqualified from sitting on a particular case. A motion for 
disqualification should be made in the case.”103 
                                                                                                                                       
almost all complaints filed under Chapter 16 allege misconduct rather than disability. Second, 
some of the confidentiality provisions in the statute may be more appropriate for dealing with 
disability than with misconduct.  
100 Breyer Committee Report, supra note 95, at [FRD] 239. 
101  9th Cir. Misconduct Rule 1(c).  
102 Id. Rule 1(f).  
103 Id.  
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Notwithstanding these repeated admonitions, complainants continue to 
invoke the Act to challenge rulings in particular cases. Indeed, complaints of this 
kind account for a very substantial portion of the total number of complaints filed 
each year. They are typically filed by prisoners and other pro se litigants, and they 
are dismissed in accordance with the statute. In 2006, for example, about three-
quarters of the complaints concluded by chief judges were dismissed as “directly 
related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling.”104  
At the same time, it is important to emphasize that the “merits-related” 
exclusion does not cut as deeply into the statute‟s coverage as one might expect. 
As the Breyer Committee has explained, an allegation is merits-related only if it 
does no more than call into question “the correctness of an official action of a 
judge.”105 If the complaint alleges that judge‟s action was the product of an illicit 
motive or a conspiracy or some other external circumstance, it is not merits-related 
for purposes of the statute.106  
A further complication is the relationship between the “merits-related” 
exclusion and the processes of appellate review. Most merits-related complaints 
are subject to correction on appeal, but the availability – or unavailability – of an 
appellate remedy is irrelevant to whether the complaint is cognizable under 
Chapter 16.107 If a complaint challenges the correctness of a judge‟s ruling, it must 
be dismissed even if the complainant has no appellate remedy. Conversely, if an 
                                              
104 2006 Judicial Business of the United States Courts, tbl. S-22. For further discussion, see 
infra Part II-D. 
105 Breyer Committee Report, supra note 95, at [FRD] 239 (emphasis added). 
106 The Breyer Committee Report and the July draft of the National Rules contain excellent 
discussions of this point.  
107 See Breyer Committee Report, supra note 95, at [FRD] 240. 
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allegation is otherwise cognizable, it should not be dismissed merely because it 
involves a ruling that has been vacated on appeal.  
The merits-related exclusion serves an important role in defining what does 
not constitute cognizable misconduct under the Act, but it does not help to identify 
judicial behavior that does fall within Chapter 16‟s scope. For that, the judges who 
administer the Act must look elsewhere. And they do – to the Code of Conduct for 
United States Judges.108 The Code, promulgated by the Judicial Conference of the 
United States, consists of seven “canons,” most of which have numerous subparts. 
The canons and the accompanying commentary provide detailed guidance for the 
conduct of judges both on and off the bench.109  
The judiciary has emphasized that violation of the Code, of itself, does not 
necessarily constitute misconduct under the Act.110 Nevertheless, in administering 
the Act, the judges have repeatedly looked to the Code for guidance in 
determining whether misconduct has occurred. Here, by way of example, are some 
of the Code provisions that have been invoked by chief judges and circuit councils 
in considering complaints under the Act: 
 Canon 2B: “A judge should not lend the prestige of the judicial office 
to advance the private interests of others…” 111 
                                              
108 The current version of the Code can be found at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/ch1.html.  
109 In addition to the Code and commentary, the United States Judicial Conference 
Committee on Codes of Conduct has issued a collection of advisory opinions that interpret and 
apply the canons. Links to some of the opinions can be found at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/advisoryopinions.htm. 
110 See, e.g., In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 91 F.3d 1416, 1417 (Judicial Council of 
the 10th Circuit 1996) (Seymour, C.J.). The Code itself makes clear that disciplinary action is not 
necessarily appropriate “for every violation of its provisions.” 
111 See, e.g., In re Complaint No. 329 (Judicial Council of the 1st Cir. 2002) (Boudin, C.J.) 
(on file with the author). This complaint involved District Judge Edward Harrington. For 
discussion see infra Part II-F-6.  
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 Canon 3A(3): “A judge should be patient, dignified, respectful, and 
courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with 
whom the judge deals in an official capacity…” 112 
 Canon 3A(4): “[Except as authorized by law, a judge should] neither 
initiate nor consider ex parte communications on the merits, or 
procedures affecting the merits, of a pending or impending 
proceeding.”113 
 Canon 5B: “A judge may serve as [a director] of an educational [or 
other] organization not conducted for the economic or political 
advantage of its members, [but not] if it is likely that the organization 
will be engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before the 
judge or will be regularly engaged in adversary proceedings in any 
court.”114 
 Canon 7A(2): “A judge should not … publicly endorse or oppose a 
candidate for public office.”115  
 Canon 7A(3): “A judge should not … solicit funds for or pay an 
assessment or make a contribution to a political organization or 
candidate …”116  
                                              
112 See, e.g., In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, No. 99-6-372-48 (Judicial Council of 
the 6th Cir. 2001) (on file with the author). This complaint involved District Judge Jon P. 
McCalla. For discussion see infra Part II-F-6. 
113 See, e.g., In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, No. 05-89097 (Judicial Council of the 
9th Cir. 2006) (Report of the Special Committee) (on file with the author). This order – which at 
this writing has not been officially made public – involved District Judge Manuel Real. For 
discussion see infra Part II-F-5.  
114 See, e.g., In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, No. 04-6-351-17 (Judicial Council of 
the 6th Cir. 2005) (Loken, Acting C.J.) (on file with the author). This order involved Chief Judge 
Danny Boggs of the Sixth Circuit.  
115 See, e.g., In re Charges of Judicial Misconduct, 404 F.3d 688 (Judicial Council of the 2d 
Cir. 2005). This proceeding involved Judge Guido Calabresi of the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals.   
116 See, e.g., In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, No. 07-6-351-01 (Judicial Council of 
the 6th Cir. 2007) (Boggs, C.J.) (on file with the author). This complaint involved Judge Deborah 
L. Cook of the Sixth Circuit. For discussion, see infra Part II-F-2. 
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C. Procedures under Chapter 16 
Ordinarily, the process under Chapter 16 begins with the filing of a 
complaint about a judge with the clerk of the court of appeals for the circuit. “Any 
person” may file a complaint; the complainant need not have any connection with 
the proceedings or activities that are the subject of the complaint, nor must the 
complainant have personal knowledge of the facts asserted. 117 The clerk must 
“promptly transmit” the complaint to the chief judge of the circuit. The chief 
judge, after “expeditiously reviewing” the complaint, has three options. He or she 
can: (a) dismiss the complaint; (b) “conclude the proceeding” if he or she finds 
that “appropriate corrective action has been taken or that action on the complaint 
is no longer necessary because of intervening events;” or (c) appoint a special 
committee to investigate the allegations. 
From a procedural perspective, options (a) and (b) are treated identically. 
The statute can thus be viewed as establishing a two-track system for the handling 
of complaints against judges. Track One is the “chief judge track;” Track Two is 
the “special committee track.”118  
If the chief judge dismisses the complaint or terminates the proceeding, a 
dissatisfied complainant may seek review of the decision by filing a petition 
addressed to the judicial council of the circuit. The judicial council may order 
further proceedings, or it may deny review. If the judicial council denies review, 
that is ordinarily the end of the matter; in Track One cases, the statute provides 
that there is no further review “on appeal or otherwise.”119 However, the Judicial 
                                              
117 For discussion of this aspect of the statutory scheme, see infra Part II-F-1.  
118 More precisely, Track Two is the “chief judge/special committee track.” For ease of 
reference I will use the shorter label.  
119 In the misconduct proceedings involving Judge Real, the Judicial Council of the Ninth 
Circuit “affirmed” the order of the Chief Judge dismissing a complaint. In re Complaint of 
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Conference of the United States may have authority to require further proceedings 
even when the chief judge and the circuit council have declined to do so.120 
If the chief judge does not dismiss the complaint or terminate the proceeding, 
he or she must promptly appoint a “special committee” to “investigate the facts 
and allegations contained in the complaint.” A special committee is composed of 
the chief judge and equal numbers of circuit and district judges of the circuit. 
Special committees have power to issue subpoenas; sometimes they hire private 
counsel to assist in their inquiries.121 
After conducting its investigation, the special committee files a report with 
the circuit council. The report must include the findings of the investigation as 
well as recommendations. The circuit council then has a variety of options: it may 
conduct its own investigation; it may dismiss the complaint; or it may take action 
including the imposition of sanctions.  
Final authority within the judicial system rests with the Judicial Conference 
of the United States. A complainant or judge who is aggrieved by an order of the 
circuit council can file a petition for review by the Conference; in addition, the 
circuit council can refer serious matters to the Conference on its own motion. If 
the Conference determines that “consideration of impeachment may be 
warranted,” it may so certify to the House of Representatives.  
                                                                                                                                       
Judicial Misconduct, 425 F.3d 1179 (Judicial Council of Ninth Circuit 2005). This was 
technically incorrect. The statute says: “The denial of a petition for review of the chief judge‟s 
order shall be final and conclusive and shall not be judicially reviewable on appeal or otherwise.” 
(Emphasis added.) The implication is that if the Judicial Council finds the appeal to be without 
merit, it should deny the petition for review, not affirm. 
120 See infra Part II-F-4. 
121 For example, when the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit belatedly appointed a special 
committee to investigate the allegations against Judge Manuel Real, the special committee 
retained a prominent San Francisco lawyer as its counsel. 
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Congress has authorized the Conference to delegate its review power to a 
standing committee, and the Conference has done so.122 Until 2007, the committee 
was known as the Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct and Disability 
Orders. The name was changed in 2007; it is now the Committee on Judicial 
Conduct and Disability.  
D. Implementation of Chapter 16: the statistics  
Each year, the Director of the Administrative Office of United States Courts 
(AO) includes in the AO‟s annual statistical report a tabulation, based on data 
submitted by the various circuits, of the number of complaints filed and concluded 
during the preceding year.123 In addition, the Breyer Committee carried out its 
own analysis of the raw data submitted to the AO for the years 2001-2005. That 
analysis, along with data in the AO reports for earlier years, gives us a good 
picture of how the statutory procedures have been implemented by the 
judiciary.124  
The number of complaints filed against judges each year ranges from 600 to 
800. In the five years studied by the Breyer Committee, 2001-2005, the total was 
3,670. (For reasons that are not clear, there was a “spike” in 1998, when the total 
exceeded 1,000.) The overwhelming majority of the complaints – more than 95% 
– are dismissed by the chief judge. In a majority of the dismissals, the chief judge 
relies on the provision of the statute that authorizes dismissal of complaints that 
                                              
122 See 28 USC § 331; In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 37 F.3d 1511 (U.S. Judicial 
Conference Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct and Disability Orders 1994). 
123 This information is compiled and published pursuant to an explicit Congressional 
mandate. See 28 USC § 604(h)(2) (originally enacted as part of the 1980 Act).  
124 The Breyer Committee found some errors in the data submitted by the circuits to the AO 
The Committee expressed particular concern about “the apparent underreporting of matters not 
dismissed by the chief judge.” Breyer Committee Report, supra note 95, at 30. 
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are “directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling.”125 Another 
common reason for dismissal is that the complaint is “frivolous.”126 (Many chief 
judge orders give more than one reason, with “frivolous” and “merits-related” 
frequently paired.) About half of the complainants ask the circuit council to review 
the dismissals, but almost none succeed; the Breyer Committee found only one 
instance in which the circuit council directed the chief judge to appoint a special 
committee.127 
                                              
125 See supra Part II-B. Most of the orders dismissing complaints as “directly related to the 
merits of a decision” are brief and formulaic. One that is not is In re Complaint of Judicial 
Misconduct, J.C. No. 99-50 (Judicial Council of the 3d Cir. 2000) (Becker, C.J.) (on file with the 
author). The misconduct order does not identify the underlying case or the judge who was the 
target of the complaint, but a later opinion confirms that the case was Lambert v. Blackwell, 962 
F. Supp. 1521 (E.D. Pa.), rev‟d, 134 F.3d 506 (3d Cir. 1997), and the target was District Judge 
Stewart Dalzell. As Chief Judge Becker explained, the complaint was filed by “the parents of a 
young woman who was brutally murdered.” The woman convicted of the murder filed a habeas 
corpus petition, and the case was assigned to Judge Dalzell. After extended proceedings, Judge 
Dalzell not only agreed that the defendant‟s constitutional rights had been violated; he ordered 
that she be released and “and that she should not be retried.” 962 F. Supp. at 1523. (That decision 
was reversed on appeal.) The judicial misconduct complaint alleged that Judge Dalzell “ignored 
the law,” “undermined our justice system,” and “severely damaged the lives and reputations of 
many dedicated and honest people.” Chief Judge Becker “studied the record in the underlying 
case with great care.” He found that Judge Dalzell had used language in his opinion that was 
“excessive,” “hyperbolic,” and even “intemperate.” But he concluded that “the offending 
language was merely part of „the decision making process‟” and thus “directly related to the 
merits of” the judge‟s decisions. He dismissed the complaint. The habeas proceedings continued 
in the district court, but Judge Dalzell ultimately recused himself from the case. See Lambert v. 
Blackwell, 205 F.R.D. 180 (E.D. Pa. 2002). The case was reassigned to another judge, who found 
that habeas relief was not warranted. The Third Circuit affirmed. Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 
210 (3d Cir. 2004). 
126 “Frivolous” complaints include those that are “lacking sufficient evidence to raise an 
inference that misconduct has occurred [or] containing allegations which are incapable of being 
established through investigation.” See Breyer Committee Report, supra note 95, at 28. 
Technically, the statute treats the latter two grounds as separate from frivolousness. See 28 U.S.C. 
§352(b)(1)(A)(iii).  
127 See Breyer Committee Report, supra note 95, at 30. As the Committee notes, this action 
was not reported by the circuit council to the Administrative Office. Based on the AO report, one 
would have concluded that review of dismissals was denied in every case in which it was sought. 
For a description of the complaint and its handling, see id. at 71-72; Washington Post, Feb. 27, 
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Disposition other than dismissal is rare. In about 1% of the cases, the chief 
judge concludes the proceeding on the ground that appropriate corrective action 
has been taken or that, because of intervening events, action is no longer 
necessary. Appointment of a special committee is even rarer. The Breyer 
Committee found that in the five years 2001-2005, chief judges appointed only 
nine special committees “to investigate 15 complaints filed against nine 
judges.”128 On the basis of the reports filed by the special committees, the circuit 
councils dismissed six complaints against five judges. There were only four 
instances in which discipline was imposed by a circuit council. Two judges were 
publicly censured (in proceedings involving seven complaints), and one judge was 
censured privately. “Other discipline” was imposed in the fourth case, but the case 
file is sealed, and no information is available about the nature of the misconduct.  
E. Evaluation of the Act’s implementation 
The numbers are stark: in the five years 2001-2005, more than 3,500 
complaints were filed against federal judges, but only 15 led to the appointment of 
a special committee, and sanctions were imposed on only four judges. Based on 
this record, it is natural to ask: are the chief judges and the circuit councils doing 
the job that Congress expected them to do? Can litigants and citizens rely on the 
judiciary to deal effectively with misconduct in its ranks? Two thorough and well-
documented studies address those questions.  
The first study was the one conducted by Jeffrey Barr and Thomas Willging 
for the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal. The results of 
                                                                                                                                       
2001, at A21 (available on NEXIS, NEWS library). The special committee and the circuit council 
ultimately found no misconduct. 
128 Breyer Committee Report, supra note 95, at 29. 
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that research are reassuring. For example, in a field study that examined a sample 
of 469 complaints, the authors found only 12 “problem dispositions.”129 
More recently, the Breyer Committee undertook its own study using a 
“research plan” that enabled it “to examine both (1) the vast bulk of complaints 
that receive little or no public notice, and (2) the very few „high-visibility‟ 
complaints.” Justice Breyer and his colleagues reached two major conclusions. 
They found that “chief circuit judges and judicial councils are doing a very good 
overall job in handling complaints filed under the Act. The overall rate of 
problematic dispositions is quite low and has not increased measurably over more 
than a decade despite steep increases in the number of complaints filed and the 
overall workload of chief circuit judges.”130 But in separately assessing the “high-
visibility cases,” the Committee found “mishandling” in 5 out of 17 – an “error 
rate” that it acknowledged is “far too high.”  
In assessing the credibility of the generally positive assessment that emerges 
from both studies, two other points deserve note. First, before a person becomes a 
federal judge, he or she will be investigated by the White House, by the FBI, by 
home-state Senators, by the Senate Judiciary Committee, by the American Bar 
Association, and by interest groups. Individuals with serious problems of character 
or temperament are not likely to make it through those many levels of scrutiny. 
Against that background, it would not be surprising if instances of misbehavior 
were rare.131  
                                              
129 Barr & Willging, supra note 77, at 79. 
130 Breyer Committee Report, supra note 95, at 107. 
131 Readers of this article might think that “rare” is something of an overstatement, given the 
numerous instances of misconduct by federal judges that are chronicled in these pages. But the 
episodes reported here took place over a period of more than a decade. Today there are more than 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art57
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Second, the data in the two studies do not adequately reflect the informal 
corrective processes that may take place in the absence of a formal complaint. One 
of the most important findings of the research carried out for the National 
Commission is that informal processes often operate very effectively to deal with 
matters that fall within the potential reach of Chapter 16. The Barr & Willging 
study quotes comments by two former chief judges that capture the experience in 
most of the circuits that the authors visited: 
“In my experience, the most serious complaints never hit the complaint 
process.” 
“There are more remedial actions taking place outside the complaint 
process than following formal complaints.”132 
A study by Professor Charles Geyh similarly noted how “successful” informal 
means were.133  
At the same time, it is worth emphasizing that the informal mechanisms 
derive some of their effectiveness from the existence of the formal complaint 
procedure. As Professor Geyh puts it, “the mere presence of more formal means 
for remedying judicial misconduct provides an incentive for judges to take 
seriously the informal suggestions of the chief circuit judge.”134 Where the 
                                                                                                                                       
2,000 federal judges (including active judges, senior judges, magistrate judges, and bankruptcy 
judges). In that light, I think the characterization “rare” is justified. 
132 Barr & Willging, supra note 77, at 131. The full description in the study provides 
valuable insights into the operation of informal processes. See id. at 131-44. 
133 Charles Gardner Geyh, Informal Methods of Judicial Discipline, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 243, 
311 (1993).  
134 Id. at 283. 
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misconduct is particularly serious, a judge may be persuaded to retire rather than 
face the prospect of a formal investigation and possible sanctions under the Act.135  
Although the Breyer Committee was not charged with studying informal 
mechanisms, the Committee‟s interviews made clear the continuing importance of 
activities outside the complaint process. As one chief judge told the Committee, 
“[t]he informal aspect is the most valuable part of the Act . . . , the most serious 
matters were not the subject of a complaint at all.”136 The Committee also took 
note of a confidential counseling program in the Ninth Circuit that may help to 
“get to the genuine sources of problematic behavior.”137  
F. Current issues in the administration of Chapter 16 
The research conducted by the Breyer Committee and by the National 
Commission suggests that, overall, the system of decentralized self-regulation of 
federal judicial ethics has worked well. But no system is perfect, and recent events 
– as well as the Breyer Committee report – have pointed to several aspects of the 
Chapter 16 processes that deserve scrutiny. Some of these issues are addressed in 
the proposed National Rules published by the Judicial Conference in July 2007.  
1. Opportunity to file malicious complaints 
The complaint that initiated the disciplinary proceedings against Judge 
Manuel Real was filed by a Los Angeles lawyer named Stephen Yagman. Yagman 
had no connection with the bankruptcy case that was the subject of the complaint, 
nor did he have any personal knowledge of the underlying facts. On the contrary, 
                                              
135 Id. at 284; see also Collins T. Fitzpatrick, Misconduct and Disability of Federal Judges: 
The Unreported Informal Responses, 71 Judicature 282 (1988) (“Over the last several years, there 
have been at least nine federal judicial officers who retired after a judicial misconduct complaint 
was filed or was looming in the background.”) 
136 Breyer Committee Report, supra note 95, at 101. 
137 Id. at 124. For a description of the program, see id. at 104-05. 
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as his complaint made clear, his allegations were based on his reading of the 
appellate opinion in the case and “a little district court docket research” motivated 
by his “curiosity [about] the opinion.”138  
Most lawyers would not file a complaint against a judge based on their 
reading of an appellate opinion and information on the public district court docket. 
Why did Yagman do so? As Judge Real explained at the impeachment hearing, 
there was a long history of antagonism between the two: 
In 1984, I sanctioned Mr. Yagman $250,000, the amount of the other 
side‟s attorneys‟ fees, for his persistent and willful disregard of the federal 
rules and his outrageous courtroom behavior in a defamation case I was 
handling. Matter of Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165 (9th Cir. 1986). Though the 
Court of Appeals reversed the sanction portion of my order, Mr. Yagman 
has had a personal vendetta against me ever since.139  
But under the current statutory scheme, none of that history makes any difference. 
“Any person” may file a complaint; motive (good or bad) and knowledge (or lack 
of it) are irrelevant.  
At the House impeachment hearing, one member of the Judiciary Committee 
expressed concern about this aspect of the statutory arrangement. She noted that 
there seemed to be “an element of revenge” in the filing of the complaint against 
Judge Real, and she raised the question whether some limitation might be imposed 
on “those who [can] bring complaints.”140 
The concern is understandable, but it is not sufficient to justify a change in 
the law. Congress made a very considered and conscious decision in 1980 to let 
“[a]ny person” file a complaint. Congress made that choice because it thought that 
                                              
138 See supra note 3.  
139 Real Impeachment Hearing, supra note 2, at 15-16 (statement of Hon. Manuel L. Real).  
140 Id. at  155 (remarks of Rep. Waters).  
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if the process was available only to insiders or people with personal knowledge, 
some misconduct would never come to light. The consequence is that complaints 
can be filed solely for revenge or with other malicious motives. But circuit chief 
judges can and do deal with such abuses by dismissing plainly insubstantial 
complaints. Moreover, a malicious motive does not necessarily mean that the 
complaint will be without merit. Yagman‟s accusations may well have been the 
product of a “personal vendetta,” but two months after the House impeachment 
hearing, the Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit found that Judge Real had indeed 
engaged in misconduct, and it ordered a public reprimand.141 The Council would 
never have investigated the matter if Yagman had not filed the complaint.  
2. Under-use of chief judge authority to “identify a complaint” 
A noteworthy feature of the misconduct statutes is that § 351(b) permits the 
chief judge to “identify a complaint” and thus initiate the investigatory process 
even if no complaint has been filed by a litigant or other citizen. This provision 
enables a chief judge to take preemptive action to cut short controversy – and also 
to create a formal public record that will guide and warn judges in the future. The 
value of this tool can be seen by comparing the responses of two chief judges to 
similar allegations against judges within their respective circuits. 
In 2006 the Center for Investigative Reporting disclosed that two federal 
judges had made campaign contributions after their appointment to the federal 
bench.142 This was a violation of Canon 7(A)(3) of the Code of Conduct for 
                                              
141 See infra Part II-F-5. At this writing the Judicial Council‟s decision has not yet been 
officially released.  
142 Will Evans, Judge Apologizes, http://www.muckraker.org/pg_one_investigation-1258-7-
0.html. The account in this article is based on that report and the links at the web site.  
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United States Judges.143 One of the judges was from the Sixth Circuit; the other, 
from the Ninth. The chief judge of the Sixth Circuit identified a complaint under § 
351(b) and issued a formal order concluding the proceeding. The order was 
accompanied by a detailed memorandum and a letter from the judge 
acknowledging the misconduct and apologizing for it. The judge – Deborah L. 
Cook – had previously served as an elected state judge. In her letter, she explained 
that she had not attended “the New Judges School offered … shortly after my 
confirmation” and thus was unaware of the federal rule, “which differs from the 
strictures on my previous position.”144  
 In contrast, the chief judge of the Ninth Circuit “made an inquiry” but did 
not identify a complaint under Chapter 16. Thus, no formal order was ever issued. 
Rather, a press spokesman responded to a reporter‟s inquiry by saying that the 
chief judge “accepted [the judge‟s] explanation that his wife had made the 
donations through a joint checking account.”  
Superficially, this is not very different from what happened in the Sixth 
Circuit. But by not identifying and concluding a complaint, the chief judge of the 
Ninth Circuit missed an opportunity to reinforce not only the norms but also their 
practical implications. A formal order describing the circumstances that created 
the impression of misconduct would have served as a warning to other judges to 
maintain separate checking accounts or otherwise to arrange their financial affairs 
to avoid violations of the prohibition.145 
                                              
143 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.  
144 In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, No. 07-6-351-01 (Judicial Council of the 6th 
Cir. 2007) (Boggs, C.J.) (on file with the author). 
145 In fact, the Ninth Circuit district judge‟s explanation did not account for all of the 
circumstances detailed in the investigative report. One donation listed the judge as the donor and 
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Identifying a complaint can serve a purpose even when it is unlikely that the 
disposition will assist judges in complying with their ethical obligations. The point 
is illustrated by a case described in the Breyer Committee report. The controversy 
grew out of a hearing held by the House Judiciary Committee in July 2002 to 
consider proposed sentencing legislation. One witness at the hearing was James 
M. Rosenbaum, Chief District Judge of the District of Minnesota. In October 
2002, the Judiciary Committee issued its report on the bill. The report accused 
Judge Rosenbaum of making multiple misrepresentations in his testimony at the 
hearing.146 Sometime later, the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts telephoned the chief judge of the Eighth Circuit to inform him that the 
chief counsel to the Judiciary Committee had suggested that the chief judge review 
the committee report “with an eye toward instituting judicial misconduct 
proceedings against” Judge Rosenbaum. The chief judge declined to do so. 
Instead, he wrote a letter to the AO director explaining that Judge Rosenbaum‟s 
allegedly false testimony could not constitute misconduct under the Act because 
Judge Rosenbaum was not testifying as “part of his official duties as a United 
States District Judge.” 
This conclusion is at odds with the generally accepted view of the Act‟s 
scope. For example, in 1998 the Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit publicly 
reprimanded District Judge James Ware for misrepresentations about his family 
history that he made in comments to reporters and in public speeches.147 Although 
                                                                                                                                       
“federal judge” as his occupation. But the judge‟s wife had made other donations in her own 
name, listing her occupation as “homemaker” or “not employed.”  
146 H.R. Rep. 107-769 (2002). The Report made other accusations against the judge as well, 
but these were not so clearly within the scope of the Act.  
147 In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, No. 97-80629 (Judicial Council for the Ninth 
Circuit, Aug. 7, 1998) (hereinafter Ware Misconduct Order) (on file with the author). Judge Ware 
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these falsehoods were much further removed from official duties than Judge 
Rosenbaum‟s testimony at the House Judiciary Committee hearing, the Ninth 
Circuit Council had no doubt that the judge‟s conduct fell within the Act.148 Yet 
even if the Eighth Circuit Chief Judge‟s assessment was correct, he showed poor 
judgment in declining to initiate the formal process under the Act. As the Breyer 
Committee states, in a case with such high visibility, “the better course would 
have been ... to identify a complaint, undertake whatever limited inquiry was 
necessary, and dismiss any elements that merited dismissal.”149  
The Breyer Committee report encourages chief judges to make greater use of 
“their statutory authority to identify complaints when accusations become 
public.”150 This is a sound recommendation. If there is substance to the 
allegations, the public will be reassured that the judiciary is truly committed to 
policing misconduct in its ranks. If the allegations are without merit, the process 
will help to remove the cloud that would otherwise hang over the judge‟s 
reputation. 
The proposed National Rules would implement the Breyer Committee‟s 
recommendation. Under the draft rules, if a chief judge obtains “information from 
any source” that gives “reasonable grounds to inquire into possible misconduct” 
by a judge, the chief judge “must identify a complaint and, by written order stating 
                                                                                                                                       
falsely stated that his brother had been shot dead in Alabama in 1963 in a racially motivated 
murder. The victim of the crime had a brother named James Ware, but that was not the judge.  
148 As the special committee said in the report adopted by the Circuit Council, “The 
misrepresentations reflect negatively not only on Judge Ware‟s integrity but quite possibly have 
had a regrettable effect on public confidence in the judiciary.”  
149 Breyer Committee Report, supra note 95, at 87. In the Ware matter, the complaint was 
identified by the chief judge, “prompted by a number of events that were reported widely in the 
media.” Ware Misconduct Order, supra note 147. 
150 Breyer Committee Report, supra note 95, at 110. 
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the reasons,” initiate the review process under Chapter 16.151 This language makes 
clear that the threshold for identifying a complaint is very low, and that doubts 
should be resolved in favor of instituting formal proceedings under the Act. For 
the reasons already given, the proposed approach is a good one and should be 
adopted (subject to fine-tuning in matters of detail) by the Judicial Conference.  
3. Failure of chief judges to appoint special committees  
As amended in 2002, the misconduct statute draws a clear line between the 
“chief judge track” and the “special committee track.” The statute provides: “The 
chief judge shall not undertake to make findings of fact about any matter that is 
reasonably in dispute.”152 If the facts are “reasonably in dispute,” a special 
committee must be appointed to carry out the investigation. But experience reveals 
that, too often, chief judges have dismissed complaints or concluded proceedings 
notwithstanding genuine disputes over facts or their implications. A recurring 
theme in the Breyer Committee‟s account of “problematic” cases is the failure of a 
chief judge “to submit clear factual discrepancies to special committees for 
investigation.”153 
One example cited by the Breyer Committee is the complaint against Judge 
Manuel L. Real that later became the subject of the impeachment hearing. As 
previously noted, the complaint alleged that Judge Real had improperly intervened 
in a bankruptcy case to help a woman whose probation he was supervising. Chief 
Judge Mary M. Schroeder of the Ninth Circuit initially dismissed the complaint 
upon finding that the charges were “unsupported” and also that the complaint was 
                                              
151 See Proposed National Rules, supra note 96, at 3, 8 (Rule 3(a)(2) and Rule 5(a)(1)).  
152 28 USC § 352(a). This language was not new; it was taken almost verbatim from the 
2000 edition of the Illustrative Rules.  
153 Breyer Committee Report, supra note 95, at 97. 
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“directly related to the merits of” the bankruptcy case.154 The Circuit Council 
vacated the dismissal order and remanded for further proceedings; the Chief Judge 
then dismissed the complaint again, this time on the grounds that the factual 
allegations were “not reasonably in dispute” and that Judge Real‟s assumption of 
jurisdiction over the bankruptcy case had a “legitimate basis.” That ruling was 
affirmed by the Circuit Council, but on the basis that “appropriate corrective 
action has been taken.”155 
As the Breyer Committee stated, both the Chief Judge and the Circuit 
Council departed from the requirements of Chapter 16.156 The Chief Judge 
improperly engaged in fact-finding, and the Circuit Council went astray in finding 
that corrective action had been taken. Moreover, the chief judge‟s error was 
compounded by the action of the circuit council in its review of the first order 
dismissing the complaint. It is plain from the council‟s memorandum that it 
believed that there were factual issues that remained unresolved.157 But instead of 
directing the chief judge to appoint a special committee, the council undertook its 
own investigation.158  
                                              
154 The order was never published officially, but it is included in the record of the 
impeachment hearing. See Real Impeachment Hearing, supra note 2, at 38. 
155 In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 425 F.3d 1179 (Judicial Council of the Ninth 
Circuit  2005).  
156 The misconduct complaint itself may have contributed to this mishandling. The 
complaint described the debtor as “comely” and said “it appears that Judge Real acted 
inappropriately to benefit an attractive female whom he oddly had placed on probation to 
himself.” See Real Impeachment Hearing, supra note 2, at 33, 35. The unsubstantiated insinuation 
of sexual impropriety may well have led the judges to treat the allegations of abuse of power less 
seriously than they would have done if the complaint had been limited to the latter.  
157 See In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 425 F.3d 1179, 1199-2101 (Judicial Council 
of Ninth Circuit 2005) (reprinting order of Dec. 18, 2003). 
158 The Breyer Committee found numerous faults in the handling of the complaint against 
Judge Real. See Breyer Committee Report, supra note 95, at 80-85. The report states: “The chief 
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The Breyer Committee also cited a case from the Sixth Circuit that in some 
respects is even more troublesome. The case involved the legal challenge to the 
University of Michigan law school affirmative action plan that ultimately went to 
the United States Supreme Court.159 The complaint alleged that the circuit chief 
judge manipulated the court‟s procedures for en banc hearing in order to preclude 
participation by two circuit judges who might have been expected to oppose the 
chief judge‟s position. Obviously the chief judge was recused from considering the 
complaint, so the matter was dealt with by an acting chief judge. The acting chief 
judge “found adverse facts to be undisputed and said those facts created an 
„inference of misconduct.‟”160 But she did not ask the accused judge if he disputed 
the facts – as indeed he did.161 Instead, she concluded the proceedings based on 
corrective action and intervening events.162 The result, as the Breyer Committee 
said, “was a finding of misconduct and a public reprimand without a hearing.”163 
In these and other cases, the chief judges appear to have misapprehended the 
import of the statutory language – and also the structure of the system established 
by Congress. The standard for appointing a special committee is not a stringent 
one. Any genuine dispute over facts – whether small or large – requires that the 
complaint be placed on the special committee track.  
                                                                                                                                       
judge and judicial council actions are inconsistent with our Standards in respect to the chief 
judge‟s fact finding and the council‟s finding of corrective action.” Id. at 83.  
159 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
160 Breyer Committee Report, supra note 95, at [FRD] 181. 
161 “In fact, the subject judge‟s petition for council review of the [acting] chief judge‟s order 
disputed all four sets of facts that the order declared „undisputed.‟” Breyer Committee Report, 
supra note 95, at 76. 
162 In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct No. 03-6-372-07 (Judicial Council of the 6th Cir. 
2003) (Batchelder, Acting C.J.) (on file with the author).  
163 Breyer Committee Report, supra note 95, at [FRD] 181.  
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At the same time, it is worth emphasizing that special committee procedures 
need not be elaborate. If the factual issues are simple, the committee can proceed 
quickly, without hiring outside counsel. But the more formal procedure will 
provide reassurance that the facts have been developed and that dismissal of the 
complaint – if that is the result – is justified. 
The proposed National Rules are consistent with the approach suggested 
here, although the rules themselves may not sufficiently emphasize the narrow 
scope of the “limited inquiry” that the chief judge may undertake. The 
commentary states that a matter is not “reasonably” in dispute – and thus may be 
resolved by the chief judge – “if a limited inquiry shows the allegations to lack 
any factual foundation or to be conclusively refuted by objective evidence.”164 The 
implication is that if the allegations have some factual foundation, or if objective 
evidence leaves some room for crediting them, a special committee must be 
appointed. It would be better to make this standard explicit.   
4. Limited powers of the Judicial Conference review committee 
After the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council affirmed the dismissal of the 
complaint against Judge Real, attorney-complainant Stephen Yagman asked the 
Judicial Conference of the United States to review the Council‟s action. The 
Conference referred the matter to its Committee to Review Circuit Council 
Conduct and Disability Orders (later renamed the Committee on Conduct and 
Disability).165 By a 3-to-2 vote, the Committee found that it had no jurisdiction “to 
                                              
164 Proposed Misconduct Rules, supra note 96, at 16.  
165 For accuracy as well as symmetry, the committee should really be named the Committee 
on Misconduct and Disability. In the remainder of this subsection, I shall use the shorthand 
“Conduct Committee.”  
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address the substance of the complaint.”166 The majority explained: “[T]he statute 
gives the Committee no explicit authority to review the Judicial Council‟s order 
affirming the chief judge‟s dismissal of the complaint. We believe it inappropriate 
to find that we have implicit authority.”167 The panel also noted the language of 28 
USC § 352(c): “The [circuit council‟s] denial of a petition for review of the chief 
judge‟s order shall be final and conclusive and shall not be judicially reviewable 
on appeal or otherwise.”  
Two committee members, dissenting, objected that the majority‟s holding 
“means that chief circuit judges and circuit judicial councils are free to disregard 
statutory requirements. In fact, by disregarding those requirements, they may 
escape review of their decisions.” The dissent described in some detail the factual 
issues left unresolved by the proceedings in the Ninth Circuit. It added: “The 
absence of a special committee has left the record in this matter something of a 
black box.” Implicitly, the dissent was saying that the circuit council had 
undertaken to perform the investigative functions of the special committee – but 
without the procedural protections and appellate rights that are part of that track.  
Apparently perturbed by this result, the Executive Committee of the Judicial 
Conference asked the Conduct Committee to consider “possible legislative or 
other action to address the jurisdictional problem” that the opinions in the Real 
matter had identified. The Conduct Committee did so at its meeting in January 
2007. By that time, the Committee membership had changed. The reconstituted 
Committee concluded that in Track One cases the Judicial Conference does have 
                                              
166 In re Opinion of Judicial Conference Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct and 
Disability Orders, 449 F.3d 106, 108 (Judicial Conference of the U.S. 2006).  
167 Id. at 109. 
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the authority to determine “whether a particular misconduct complaint requires the 
appointment of a special investigating committee.”168 The Committee urged the 
Judicial Conference to “take action to explicitly authorize the Committee” to 
exercise this authority. Under the Committee‟s proposal, review would be 
mandatory “if any member of a judicial council expressly requests such review” or 
argues in dissent that appointment of a special committee is warranted. In other 
cases, review would be available “at the discretion of the Committee.”  
The Judicial Conference considered the Committee recommendations at its 
March 2007 meeting. It asked the Committee “to prepare for Conference 
consideration” rules that would implement the Committee‟s recommendations. 
The Committee did so, and the July 2007 draft rules include provisions for review 
along the lines of the January 2007 proposal.  
In support of its conclusion that the Judicial Conference has a power of 
review even when no special committee has been appointed in the circuit, the 
Conduct Committee relied on two provisions of Title 28. First, the Committee 
cited 28 USC § 331, the statute that defines the powers of the Judicial Conference. 
One sentence in the statute authorizes the Judicial Conference to “prescribe and 
modify rules for the exercise of the authority provided in chapter 16.” The 
Committee also relied on 28 USC § 358(a).  That section empowers the 
Conference to “prescribe such rules for the conduct of proceedings under [Chapter 
16], including the processing of petitions for review, as [it] considers to be 
appropriate.” 
                                              
168 Report of the Judicial Conference Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct and 
Disability Orders at 4 (2007) (on file with the author).  
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The Conduct Committee did not explain how its recommendation could be 
reconciled with the seemingly explicit prohibition in 28 USC § 352(c), quoted 
earlier: “The [circuit council‟s] denial of a petition for review of the chief judge's 
order shall be final and conclusive and shall not be judicially reviewable on appeal 
or otherwise.” Perhaps the most plausible explanation is that the Committee views 
the proposed exercise of authority as a separate proceeding rather than as a review 
of the circuit council‟s disposition.169 Under this rationale, if the Judicial 
Conference (or its Conduct Committee) concludes that the circuit council was 
wrong in denying review of a chief judge dismissal order, it would not reverse the 
denial; rather, it would simply direct that a special committee be appointed.170 
Or would it? The Conduct Committee is actually rather circumspect in 
defining the precise scope of the review power it contemplates. In its report to the 
Judicial Conference, the Committee repeatedly states that upon adoption of its 
proposal the Committee would have authority to “examine” whether a misconduct 
complaint requires the appointment of a special committee. But what would the 
Committee do if, after examining a complaint, it finds that a special committee 
should be appointed? The Committee does not say. In particular, it does not say 
that the Committee would order the appointment. Nor do the proposed rules. The 
draft Rules provide only that “[i]f the committee determines that a special 
                                              
169 Another possibility is that the Committee reads the reference to “judicial[] review[]” in 
section 352(c) as referring only to case-and-controversy adjudication by judges acting in their 
judicial capacity. But that rationale would not explain how its proposal allows the Conference to 
take a second look at a disposition that Congress has said is “final and conclusive.” 
170 The proceeding would thus be analogous to federal habeas corpus as a device for 
reviewing state criminal convictions. The federal habeas court does not “reverse” the judgment of 
conviction; it directs the state (typically through the warden) to release the defendant unless a 
new trial is held within a specified period.  
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art57
 Hellman – Judicial Ethics Page 53 
 R9 September 20, 2007  
committee should be appointed, the Committee must issue a written decision 
giving its reasons.”171  
Probably the Committee takes the approach it does because it is relying on 
two provisions of Title 28 that authorize the Judicial Conference to prescribe rules, 
but not to issue orders. I suspect that the Committee anticipates that a declaration 
by the Committee would be sufficient to persuade a circuit chief judge or circuit 
council to reverse course without the need for a formal order designated as such. 
And probably it would be.  
At the hearing on the bill to create an Inspector General for the federal 
judiciary, I suggested that the proposed new office could serve to fill the “gap” in 
Chapter 16 that was revealed by the Conduct Committee‟s conclusion that it had 
no jurisdiction over the complaint involving Judge Real. The Conduct Committee 
has now changed course, and it believes that it can fill the gap within the 
framework of the existing legislation. The proposed new approach represents 
sound policy, both in general outline and in the provision for mandatory review if 
any member of the circuit council requests it. But the preferable way of 
implementing the suggestion would be through statutory amendment. The 
proposed rule appears to stretch the language of Title 28, with the purpose of 
allowing the reopening of disciplinary proceedings that would otherwise have 
concluded. In that setting, there should be no room for doubt as to the legitimacy 
of what is being done.172  
                                              
171 Proposed Misconduct Rules, supra note 96, at 34 ((Rule 21(b)(2)). 
172 The commentary in the July draft says only that the proposed rules “are intended to fill a 
jurisdictional gap as to review of dismissals or conclusions of complaints [within the circuit.].” 
Proposed Misconduct Rules, supra note 96, at 35 (commentary). Nothing in the commentary 
explains how the review scheme can be reconciled with the language of Chapter 16.  
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5. Undue bias against public disclosure 
Except in the rare case where the Judicial Conference determines that 
impeachment may be warranted, Chapter 16 provides for only limited public 
disclosure in misconduct proceedings. Written orders issued by a judicial council 
or by the Judicial Conference of the United States to implement disciplinary action 
must be made available to the public. But unless the judge who is the subject of 
the accusation authorizes the disclosure, “all papers, documents, and records of 
proceedings related to investigations conducted under [Chapter 16] shall be 
confidential and shall not be disclosed by any person in any proceeding.” The 
statute is silent on the handling of chief judge orders dismissing a complaint or 
terminating a proceeding.  
The Illustrative Rules fill in some of the statutory gaps, but they too evince a 
bias against disclosure. The basic rule is that orders and memoranda of the chief 
judge and the judicial council will be made public only “when final action on the 
complaint has been taken and is no longer subject to review.”173 Moreover, in the 
ordinary case where the complaint is dismissed, “the publicly available materials 
will not disclose the name of the judge complained about without his or her 
consent.”  
The consequences of the bias against disclosure can be seen in a later stage 
of the proceedings involving Judge Real. After the Judicial Conference of the 
United States determined that it had no power to review the Judicial Council 
decision affirming the dismissal of the complaint, Chief Judge Mary M. Schroeder 
appointed a special committee to investigate Judge Real‟s conduct.174 The special 
                                              
173 Illustrative Rules, supra note 91, at 52 (Rule 17).  
174 Technically, this order did not direct the special committee to investigate the allegations 
contained in the original complaint against Judge Real; rather, it initiated an investigation of two 
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committee carried out a thorough inquiry; it heard testimony from 18 witnesses 
and reviewed thousands of pages of documents. It found that Judge Real had 
committed misconduct, and it recommended the sanction of a public reprimand.  
On November 16, 2006, the circuit council issued an order adopting the 
findings and recommendations of the special committee. But the order was not 
made public at that time. Rather, the order stated that it would be made public 
“when the order is no longer subject to review, or within 30 days of this order if no 
petition for review has been filed with the Judicial Conference of the United 
States.” Judge Real did file a petition for review, and at this writing the petition is 
still under consideration. As a result, the Judicial Council order has not been 
disclosed officially.175 Meanwhile, however, a copy of the order reached reporter 
Henry Weinstein of the Los Angeles Times, who published an article in December 
2006 describing its contents.176 
In withholding immediate disclosure of its order, the Ninth Circuit Judicial 
Council relied on the Council‟s Rule 17, which in turn is based on the Illustrative 
Rules. The underlying policy is that judges should be protected “from public 
airing of unfounded charges.” As explained in the Illustrative Rules:  
                                                                                                                                       
later complaints. But Chief Judge Schroeder stated explicitly that the investigation “should cover 
all matters reasonably within the scope of the „facts and allegations‟ of complaint No. 05-89097 
including the nature and extent of any ex parte contact with [Judge Real], as well as any related 
matters raised by the Judicial Council in its remand to me after my first dismissal of [the initial 
complaint against Judge Real].” In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, No 04-89030 (Judicial 
Council of the 9th Cir. 2006) (Schroeder, C.J.) (on file with the author) (emphasis added.) 
175 Some observers anticipated that the Judicial Conference would announce its decision at 
its semiannual meeting in March 2007. That did not occur. Given the thoroughness of the Special 
Committee investigation, it remains something of a mystery why the Conduct Committee and the 
Conference are taking so long to complete the appellate process.  
176 Henry Weinstein, Web error reveals censure of U.S. judge, Los Angeles Times, Dec. 23, 
2006. 
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We believe that it is consistent with the congressional intent to 
protect a judge from public disclosure of a complaint, both while it is 
pending and after it has been dismissed if that should be the outcome. ... 
In view of the legislative interest in protecting a judge from public airing 
of unfounded charges, ... the law is reasonably interpreted as permitting 
nondisclosure of the identity of a judicial officer who is ultimately 
exonerated and also permitting delay in disclosure until the ultimate 
outcome is known.177  
This rationale may be persuasive when (for example) a disgruntled litigant or a 
discharged employee has filed scurrilous – and baseless – accusations against a 
federal judge, and disclosure would cause injury to the judge without enlightening 
the public on a matter of public concern.178 But the current policy makes little 
sense in the setting of the proceedings against Judge Real. Even if one accepts “the 
legislative interest in protecting a judge from public airing of unfounded charges,” 
delaying disclosure of the Judicial Council order did nothing to serve that interest. 
The allegations had already been the subject of published opinions by the judiciary 
and a televised hearing in Congress. What is even worse, adherence to the 
deferred-disclosure rule had the perverse consequence of putting off the day when 
the public would see the serious and conscientious way in which the judiciary 
dealt with the accusations.  
                                              
177 Illustrative Rules, supra note 91, at 54. The authors concede that this is not necessarily 
the only way of reading the statute: “[P]ublic availability of orders under [28 U.S.C. ' 354(a)] is a 
statutory requirement. The statute does not prescribe the time at which these orders must be made 
public, and it might be thought implicit that it should be without delay. Similarly, the statute does 
not state whether the name of the judge must be disclosed, but it could be argued that such 
disclosure is implicit.” 
178 Even in that circumstance, the non-disclosure policy is debatable. Certainly other public 
officials do not enjoy protection from “public airing of unfounded charges.” But just as the 
Supreme Court has recognized that not all speech by government employees about the operation 
of government offices deserves First Amendment protection, see Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 
1951 (2006), one can argue that there is no legitimate public interest in learning the identity of a 
judge who has been the subject of a totally meritless accusation of misconduct.  
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The bias against disclosure can also be seen in the report of the Breyer 
Committee. The report analyzes 17 “high-visibility” complaints from the period 
2001-2005. For each complaint the report provides a detailed account of the 
allegations and the procedures followed by chief judges and circuit councils in 
considering them. But not a single one of the judges is identified. This is so even 
though the complaints had been selected for the very reason that they had become 
the subject of discussion in the media or in Congress. Of course these other 
sources do name the judges. Indeed, the judges‟ names are given in several of the 
orders that the Breyer Committee quotes.  
Why then the reticence on the part of the Committee? The Report cites Rule 
16(h) of the Illustrative Rules, which calls for “appropriate steps . . . to shield the 
identities of the judge complained against, the complainant, and witnesses from 
public disclosure.”179 But it hardly seems appropriate for the Committee to shield 
the identity of the judges in its report when the information has already been 
disclosed publicly elsewhere. And the attempt to preserve the judges‟ anonymity 
exacts a cost. First, other researchers are put to unnecessary labor to carry out 
follow-up studies or simply to make their own assessment of how the complaints 
were handled. Second and more important, by withholding the judges‟ names, the 
report reinforces the perception that the judiciary is more concerned with 
protecting its members than it is with transparency and accountability.  
In my view, the policy should be this: When the substance of a pending 
complaint has become widely known through reports in mainstream media or 
responsible web sites, there should be a presumption that orders issued by chief 
judges or circuit councils will be made public as soon as they are issued. In that 
                                              
179 Breyer Committee Report, supra note 95, at 40 (quoting Illustrative Rules).  
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circumstance there should also be a presumption that the order will disclose the 
identity of the judge. And once the information has become part of the official 
record, the judiciary should not withhold it from later reports or official 
documents.180 
The proposed National Rules do not adopt this approach. Rather, they 
embrace the restrictive policy of the Illustrative Rules: orders entered by the chief 
circuit judge and the judicial council must be made public, but only “[w]hen final 
action on a complaint has been taken and is no longer subject to review.”181 There 
is no exception for situations where the existence of the proceedings has been 
disclosed, irrespective of the nature or extent of the disclosure.  Based on the 
analysis above, I believe that this approach is short-sighted, and that a more 
flexible policy would be preferable.  
6. Failure to make the process visible 
One purpose of the mechanism established by the 1980 Act is, of course, to 
foster public confidence in the federal judiciary. To that end, the mechanism must 
be visible. Visibility in this context entails two overlapping elements: the 
availability of the process must be made known to potential complainants, and the 
results of the process must be made known to all who are interested in the 
effective operation of the judicial system.  
If there is a single glaring flaw in the administration of Chapter 16, it is the 
failure of judges at every level to make the process visible. This has been a 
problem for many years. In 1993, the National Commission reported: “Surveys 
                                              
180 The suggestions here are couched in broad terms; obviously, there are many details that 
could be the subject of debate. If adopting this policy would require amending the statute, 
Congress should take that course. 
181 Proposed Misconduct Rules, supra note 96, at 40 (Rule 24(a)). 
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conducted for the Commission demonstrate both widespread ignorance about the 
Act in virtually every respondent group and a widely shared perception that some 
meritorious complaints are never filed.”182 In 2001, at the House Judiciary hearing 
on the operation of the misconduct statutes, concerns about lack of visibility again 
came to the forefront.  
Following the 2001 hearing, Chairman Coble and Ranking Member Berman 
wrote a letter to Chief Justice Rehnquist noting that the statute was “under-
publicized.”183 They offered two specific suggestions for enhancing visibility. 
First, the Judicial Conference should require “that every federal court include a 
prominent link on its web site to the rules and forms for filing complaints ... 
concerning any judge of that court.” Second, chief judges and circuit councils 
should make their rulings under the 1980 Act more widely available to the public. 
In September 2002 the Judicial Conference endorsed both of these 
suggestions. But Judicial Conference policy does not necessarily translate into 
action at the local level. In 2005, when Breyer Committee researchers examined 
district court websites, they could not find any information about the complaint 
procedure on a majority of the sites.184 And of the 41 sites that had some 
information, many presented it “in a way that would stump most persons seeking 
to learn about how to file a complaint.”185  
                                              
182 National Commission Report, supra note 74, at 345. 
183 The letter is reprinted in H.R. Rep. 107-459 at 16-18 (2002). 
184 Breyer Committee Report, supra note 95, at 33. All of the court of appeals websites 
contained information about the Act, but it would not occur to most people that the court of 
appeals website is the place to go to file a complaint about a district judge. 
185 Id. at 109. 
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Nor has the Judicial Conference‟s exhortation resulted in wider availability 
of misconduct rulings. Today as in 2001, the orders and memoranda filed by the 
chief judges of the various circuits are available only at the clerk‟s office of the 
circuit where they were issued and at the Federal Judicial Center, to which copies 
are sent.186 Even non-routine dispositions are usually not posted on court web 
sites, nor are they provided to legal publishers like Westlaw and Lexis. Of the [16] 
final orders of chief judges or circuit councils discussed in the Breyer Committee 
Report‟s compilation of “high-visibility” complaints, only [4] can readily be found 
in the Federal Reporter or any on-line database.187  
Two of the cases are particularly noteworthy in this context. One involved a 
district judge‟s intervention in a federal sentencing proceeding. On July 31, 2002, 
Senior District Judge Edward F. Harrington of the District of Massachusetts wrote 
a letter on official court stationery to another judge on his court urging him to be 
lenient in sentencing a retired FBI special agent who had been convicted on 
racketeering charges. The letter became public the next day, and it aroused 
considerable criticism.188 On August 5, Judge Harrington withdrew the letter, but 
he insisted that he had done nothing wrong. “I believed that my letter was entirely 
                                              
186 The Breyer Committee suggested that “the better repository for such orders [might be] 
the Office of General Counsel in the Administrative Office.” Breyer Committee Report, supra 
note 95, at 119. To outsiders, of course, it makes little difference which room in the Thurgood 
Marshall Judiciary Building serves as the repository if the orders are not available on line.  
187 Curiously, in one of the Breyer Committee‟s high-visibility cases the circuit published 
the initial order of the chief judge dismissing the complaint, but not the final order of the circuit 
council issued after appointment of a special committee. This was the complaint alleging 
improper assignment of certain criminal cases by Chief Judge Norma Holloway Johnson of the 
District Court. See In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, 196 F.3d 1285 (Judicial 
Council of the D.C. Circuit 1999); In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, Feb. 26, 
2001 (No. 99-11) (on file with the author). 
188 Shelley Murphy, US Judge Asks for Connolly Leniency, Boston Globe, Aug. 2, 2002, at 
B1 (available on Nexis).  
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proper as it was requested by the defendant, relates specialized knowledge I 
acquired as a federal prosecutor, and concerns the type of information traditionally 
considered by sentencing courts,” he wrote. 
Notwithstanding the withdrawal of the letter, on August 15 Chief Judge 
Michael Boudin of the First Circuit invoked his authority to “identify a complaint” 
against Judge Harrington. He asked Judge Harrington to respond, and within days, 
Judge Harrington did so. No longer did he deny wrongdoing. Instead, he wrote:  
Upon reflection, I did commit a clear violation of Canon 2(B) of the 
Code of Conduct for United States Judges in writing a letter to District 
Judge Tauro relating to the sentencing in a criminal matter. For this act, I 
am exceedingly sorry and sincerely apologize to the Judicial Council and 
to my fellow judges in the First Circuit. 
Based on Judge Harrington‟s response, Chief Judge Boudin determined that 
“appropriate corrective action has been taken without the necessity of a formal 
investigation.” He relied on “Judge Harrington‟s withdrawal of his July 31 letter, 
his admission of a clear violation of the Code of Conduct, his sincere apology, and 
his agreement to allow all complaint materials to be made public.”189 
As the Breyer Committee aptly observes, the handling of this matter “is a 
model for the effective administration of the Act.”190 The Committee gives some 
of the reasons: “The corrective action was action taken by the [accused] judge 
himself, was commensurate with the violation, was tailored to provide whatever 
benefit was possible to persons directly affected by the violation, and was swiftly 
made public.” To this I would add that the Chief Judge deserves credit also for 
initiating the process without waiting for a complaint from a Member of Congress 
                                              
189 In re Complaint No. 329 (Judicial Council of the 1st Cir. 2002) (Boudin, C.J.) (on file 
with the author). 
190 Breyer Committee Report, supra note 95, at 92. 
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or other outsider. Yet this “model” disposition is virtually invisible. It was never 
published officially, and if the Breyer Committee had not featured it in its report it 
would have disappeared down the memory hole.  
The complaint against Judge Harrington illustrates the effective handling of a 
single act of misconduct that generated public attention at a particular moment in 
time. The Breyer Committee also describes the effective handling of a complaint 
involving a pattern of misconduct over a period of years. The judge in question 
was District Judge Jon P. McCalla of the Western District of Tennessee. Judge 
McCalla‟s courtroom behavior came to public attention in March 2000, when a 
Sixth Circuit appellate panel, in a strongly worded opinion, reprimanded him for 
“intemperate demeanor toward [a criminal defendant‟s] counsel.”191 The court 
condemned a “lengthy harangue” by Judge McCalla and said that it created an 
appearance of bias. At about the same time, formal complaints were filed against 
Judge McCalla under the 1980 Act. The complaints “portray[ed] the ... judge as 
erratic and obsessed with courtroom ethics.”192 
Sixth Circuit Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr., appointed a special 
committee to investigate the allegations. The special committee hired an outside 
counsel, who interviewed numerous witnesses. On August 29, 2001, the special 
committee prepared to hold a formal hearing. Instead, Judge McCalla appeared 
personally, apologized for his misbehavior, and agreed to take a leave of absence 
for a minimum of six months. He also agreed to undergo behavioral counseling. 
The special committee filed a report endorsing this resolution, and the Judicial 
                                              
191 United States v. Whitman, 209 F.3d 619, 624 (6th Cir. 2000). 
192 Louis Graham, Lawyer Examines McCalla‟s Behavior, Memphis Commercial Appeal, 
July 15, 2001, at A1 (available on Westlaw).  
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Council adopted an order implementing the terms of the settlement. The order 
included an unusual provision giving the special committee “continuing 
jurisdiction to monitor Judge McCalla‟s progress and the authority to approve on 
behalf of the Council Judge McCalla‟s return to the bench upon the advice of the 
[committee‟s] expert after consultation with Judge McCalla‟s treating 
psychiatrist.”193  
Judge McCalla complied with the terms of the settlement, and after six 
months he asked the special committee to allow him to resume his judicial duties. 
The committee did not do so immediately, but in September 2002 it released Judge 
McCalla from his suspension, and Judge McCalla returned to the bench (although 
he was prohibited from hearing cases involving certain lawyers “because of past 
conflicts.”)194 Eight months later, he was receiving “glowing” reviews from 
lawyers practicing in his courtroom. An editorial in the leading local newspaper 
commented that Judge McCalla‟s return to the bench demonstrated that “[b]eing a 
judge is apparently what he was meant to do.” 
The Breyer Committee justifiably characterizes the Sixth Circuit‟s handling 
of this matter as “a deft resolution of a difficult problem, giving full effect to the 
statutory policies of reforming judicial misconduct, maintaining public confidence 
in the judiciary, and preserving judges‟ independence.”195 Yet this order, too, has 
not been posted on any judiciary website, nor was it made available to legal 
                                              
193 In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, No. 99-6-372-48 (Judicial Council of the 6th 
Cir. 2001) (on file with the author). 
194 Lawrence Buser, McCalla‟s New Disposition Ruled Totally in Order, Memphis 
Commercial Appeal, May 7, 2003, at B1 (available on Westlaw). The Judicial Council order 
simply names the attorneys and the offices; it does not give a reason for the prohibition.  
195 Breyer Committee Report, supra note 95, at [FRD] 196.  
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publishers. Like the “model” disposition involving Judge Harrington, this one is 
virtually invisible.  
It is understandable that the judiciary does not wish to shine the spotlight on 
misconduct within its ranks; no institution does. However, to the extent that the 
low visibility is the result of conscious choice (rather than indifference or 
inadvertence), the policy is misguided. The courts benefit if they learn about 
problems at the earliest possible stage, and complaints under Chapter 16 can help. 
But some meritorious complaints will never be filed if the existence of the process 
is insufficiently publicized or if would-be complainants see no evidence that 
complaints are taken seriously. Failure to publicize dispositions hurts in another 
way: circuit councils and chief judges lose the opportunity to learn how other 
courts are handling allegations of misconduct or disability. More than a decade 
ago, the National Commission emphasized the importance of “developing a body 
of interpretive precedents” that would help fill in the interstices of the Act.196 That 
need remains largely unfilled today.  
The most compelling reason for greater visibility, however, is external. At a 
recent conference on the operation of appellate courts, a lawyer commented that in 
the current political climate, judges cannot argue for judicial independence by 
saying simply, “Just trust us.”197 This observation is even more apt in the context 
of regulating ethics in the judiciary. It is not enough that the misconduct 
procedures work; they must be seen to work.  
                                              
196 National Commission, supra note 74, at 352. 
197 See Arthur D. Hellman, The View from the Trenches: A Report on the Breakout Sessions 
at the 2005 National Conference on Appellate Justice, 8 J. App. Prac. & Pro. 195 (2006) (quoting 
conference participant).  
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Even when judges acknowledge the importance of visibility, their actions do 
not always comport with their words. I have already mentioned that in 1998 the 
Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit reprimanded District Judge Ware for 
“publicly misrepresent[ing] himself as the James Ware whose younger brother, 
Virgil, was shot and killed in 1963 while both were riding a bicycle in 
Birmingham, Alabama.” The special committee report, which was adopted by the 
circuit council, pointedly states: “Because of the very public nature of the original 
tragedy and the public nature of the misrepresentations, as well as their discovery, 
it is important that discipline of Judge Ware be public and a part of the historical 
record.”198 Yet anyone looking in the places where one would expect to find “the 
historical record” of a judicial ruling – the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals website 
or the legal databases – would come away empty-handed.  
The Breyer Committee called for aggressive action to enforce the two 
September 2002 exhortations of the Judicial Conference. It recommended that 
judicial councils require the courts within their circuits to post information on the 
home pages of court websites.199 And it urged the Judicial Conference to make 
misconduct orders more widely available – specifically, to post “non-routine” 
dispositions on the judicial branch‟s public website.200 These modest steps are 
long overdue.  
And more can be done. The Illustrative Rules now provide: “In cases in 
which [chief judge or circuit council] memoranda appear to have precedential 
                                              
198 Ware Misconduct Order, supra note 147 (emphasis added).  
199 See Breyer Committee Report, supra note 95, at 120-21. 
200 See id. at 117-19.  
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
 Hellman – Judicial Ethics Page 66 
 R9 September 20, 2007  
value, the chief judge may cause them to be published.”201 This is too grudging. 
First, publication should be encouraged not only when dispositions “appear to 
have precedential value,” but also when they resolve complaints that have been the 
subject of discussion in the media or in Congress. Second, the rule should 
encourage chief judges and circuit councils to provide sufficient explanation in 
their orders to enable outsiders to assess the appropriateness of the disposition. If – 
as in the McCalla case – a detailed account might interfere with the effectiveness 
of the remedy, the detail can be omitted. But that situation will not be common.  
Visibility-enhancing measures like these serve a purpose irrespective of the 
outcome of the proceedings. If the judge is found to have engaged in misconduct, 
the media and interested citizens can ascertain whether the circuit council has dealt 
with the matter appropriately. If the judge is exonerated, people will be able to 
find out why. A thorough explanation will help build confidence in the courts; it 
will also help to clear the judge‟s name.  
III. Conclusion 
In the overwhelming majority of cases, the federal judiciary acts 
conscientiously and effectively to assure that judges comply with the high ethical 
standards we expect of them. But as the Breyer Committee pointed out, it is the 
few high-visibility controversies that shape public perceptions, and as to those, the 
record is more mixed.  
If there is a single thread that runs through the various lapses chronicled by 
the Committee and other observers, it is this: at each stage of the process, the chief 
judge or circuit council opts for the action that is less structured and less public. 
                                              
201 Illustrative Rules, supra note 91, at 53. The proposed National Rules speak in similar 
terms.  
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The chief judge conducts an inquiry but does not identify a complaint. The chief 
judge investigates factual matters that are in dispute but does not establish a 
special committee. The chief judge or circuit council resolves a complaint but does 
not post the opinion on the court‟s web site or make it available to on-line 
services. 
To remedy these failings, the Breyer Committee offers a number of specific 
recommendations that point in the direction of greater procedural formality and 
enhanced visibility. But the Committee‟s most important recommendation is, in 
essence, organizational. The recommendation is addressed in the first instance to 
the Judicial Conference of the United States, and it involves the responsibilities 
and powers of the committee then known as the Committee to Review Circuit 
Council Conduct and Disability Orders. Justice Breyer and his colleagues call 
upon the Conference to give the Committee “a new, formally recognized, vigorous 
advisory role” in guiding and counseling chief circuit judges and judicial councils 
in implementing the 1980 Act.202 In addition, the Breyer Committee urges the 
Committee itself to consider “periodic monitoring of the Act‟s administration.”203 
The Judicial Conference has already taken steps to implement these 
suggestions. As already noted, the Conference changed the name of the Review 
Committee; the committee is now known as the Committee on Judicial Conduct 
and Disability. The revised nomenclature appears to contemplate a broader 
assignment of responsibilities and perhaps also a more forward-looking 
perspective. Consistent with that assessment, the Conference directed the newly 
renamed committee “to recommend guidelines and, if necessary, new rules for 
                                              
202 Breyer Committee Report, supra note 95, at 109. 
203 Id. at 122. 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
 Hellman – Judicial Ethics Page 68 
 R9 September 20, 2007  
implementing the judicial disability statute in a uniform manner throughout the 
federal court system.”204 The Committee did as requested; the proposed National 
Rules would “provide mandatory and nationally uniform provisions governing the 
substantive and procedural aspects of misconduct and disability proceedings under 
the Act.”205  
Implicit in the Breyer Committee‟s organizational recommendations is a 
twofold judgment: first, that self-regulation of federal judicial ethics requires a 
somewhat greater degree of centralization than now exists; and, second, that it is 
desirable to have an entity within the judiciary whose single function is – and is 
known to be – that of strengthening judicial ethics and enhancing transparency.206 
In these respects, the Breyer Committee‟s prescription bears a close resemblance 
to the approach taken by Chairman Sensenbrenner in his proposal to establish an 
Inspector General for the Judicial Branch.207 I do not minimize the other features 
of the bill – the ones that that the Judiciary denounced in such strong terms. But I 
believe that these elements could have been modified in an acceptable way if both 
sides had looked for common ground.208 In any event, if the judiciary whole-
heartedly implements the Breyer Committee recommendations, further legislation 
need not go beyond fine-tuning the existing system.  
                                              
204 See http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/judconf031307.html. 
205 Proposed Misconduct Rules, supra note 96, at 3 (commentary).  
206 To be sure, there are other Conference committees that focus on ethics – the Codes of 
Conduct Committee and the Committee on Financial Disclosure. But these committees operate 
almost completely out of the public eye.  
207 See 2006 Judicial Transparency Hearing, supra note 85, at 41 (statement of Arthur D. 
Hellman).  
208 The version of the Inspector General bill introduced in the 110th Congress incorporates 
several of the suggestions made by academic witnesses (including the author of this article) at the 
2006 hearing.  
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But more is at stake than the effective operation of the procedures that 
govern the regulation of federal judicial ethics. There is widespread concern today 
about threats to the independence of the judiciary. My own view is that the 
perception of threats is overdrawn,209 but if the judiciary is to defend itself 
successfully against incursions on its independence, the public must believe that 
the system of self-regulation is working. At a minimum, the Judicial Conference 
and the circuit councils should adopt the recommendations of the Breyer 
Committee. But what is more important is that the judiciary internalize a genuine 
commitment to transparency and visibility in the regulation of ethics. Today‟s 
technology readily provides the means; all that is required is the will.  
                                              
209 See Arthur D. Hellman, Justice O‟Connor and “The Threat to Judicial Independence”: 
The Cowgirl Who Cried Wolf? – Ariz. St. L. J. – (forthcoming 2007). 
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